Jurisdiction as Power
Ryan C. Williams†
For centuries, courts and legal commentators defined “jurisdiction” by reference to a court’s “power.” A court that lacked jurisdiction, under this conception,
simply lacked the ability to bind the parties, and its resulting rulings could therefore
be regarded by both litigants and later courts as void and of no legal effect. But in
the middle decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court and other U.S.
courts strongly embraced the so-called bootstrap doctrine—a distinctive branch of
preclusion law that severely limits the ability to collaterally attack a judgment based
on a claimed lack of jurisdiction. Because the bootstrap doctrine effectively allows
courts to establish their own jurisdiction simply by concluding that they possess it,
critics of the power-based conception contend that the definition no longer provides
a descriptively plausible or conceptually coherent account of jurisdiction’s identity.
This Article defends the traditional power-based conception of jurisdiction’s
identity as both conceptually coherent and normatively desirable. The key to reconciling jurisdiction-as-power with the bootstrap doctrine is to recognize that different
criteria may be appropriate for different decision makers at different stages of the
adjudicatory process. From the perspective of the rendering court, the applicable jurisdictional rules supply the sole criteria of legal validity. A conscientious judge seeking to work within the confines of her own authority has no discretion to ignore jurisdictional limits or to proceed to a final judgment unless she determines that
jurisdiction actually exists. But from the perspective of a later court called upon to
recognize an earlier court’s judgment, the criteria of validity are supplied instead by
the bootstrap doctrine. That doctrine would sometimes require a later court to act as
if jurisdiction were present in the original proceeding even if it was not. But such “as
if” exceptions are a familiar part of our law and are not generally understood to
supplant or displace the underlying legal rules.
The power-based conception of jurisdiction is not only descriptively plausible
and conceptually coherent; it also facilitates jurisdiction’s distinctive role in structuring and allocating decision-making authority between different actors and
institutions. Understanding jurisdiction as power can also lead to a deeper understanding of jurisdiction’s necessary effects and illustrate why several of the effects
often associated with jurisdiction—such as nonwaivability and insusceptibility to
equitable exceptions—are not, in fact, essential to jurisdiction’s identity. Finally, a
clearer understanding of jurisdiction’s identity as the “power” of a rendering court
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can also help inform and clarify various jurisdictional doctrines and lead to a better
understanding of the federal judiciary’s role in the constitutional structure.
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INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction is a concept that only a lawyer could love—and
only a particular kind of lawyer at that. The fascination that jurisdiction inspires in this particular kind of lawyer does not stem
solely from the intricate puzzles that tend to characterize jurisdictional doctrines1 nor from jurisdiction’s important structural
role in defining and circumscribing the authority of courts within

1
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1141, 1142 (1988) (observing that the “law of judicial federalism . . . is wracked by
internal contradictions”). See also generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional
Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 251 (2005) (describing one such puzzle).
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our constitutional system.2 The lawyerly fascination with jurisdiction derives as well from the intriguing, and sometimes jarring, juxtaposition between jurisdiction as an abstract, conceptual ideal and the on-the-ground reality of jurisdiction as a
practical legal doctrine guiding the workaday business of the
state and federal courts.
As an ideal, jurisdiction reflects the “power,” or basic authority, of the court.3 A court without jurisdiction on this view is like
an unplugged appliance: it simply will not function for its intended purpose.4 In reality, however, even a court that clearly
lacks jurisdiction can fully establish the legal rights and obligations of the parties before it by entering a binding judgment.5
As an ideal, jurisdiction imposes upon courts a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,”6
an obligation claimed to be “inflexible and without exception.”7
But in reality, jurisdiction “involves intermittent deviations and
occasional bends” that “releas[e] courts from the duties that jurisdiction would seem to impose.”8
As an ideal, “jurisdiction is something separate, special, and
unique”—an autonomous conceptual domain that is not merely
distinct from the domain of nonjurisdictional rules but is rather
“a rigid antipode to nonjurisdictional law, such as procedural
rules and substantive elements.”9 In reality, rules classified as

2
See, e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55,
59 (2008) (observing that jurisdiction “embodies societal values, such as federalism, separation of powers, and a limited national government”) [hereinafter In Search of
Jurisdiction].
3
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (describing
subject matter jurisdiction as “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
the case” (emphasis in original)); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)
(“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”).
4
See Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613,
1616–17 (2003) (analogizing the power conception of jurisdiction “to an unplugged electrical appliance”).
5
See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293–94 (1952); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940).
6
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
7
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95 (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
8
Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 992 (2009).
9
Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1440–41 (2011)
[hereinafter Hybridizing Jurisdiction].
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“jurisdictional” blend so subtly and imperceptibly into nonjurisdictional rules that courts and commentators struggle to identify
(and, in some cases, to draw) the lines that separate the two.10
In view of these tensions that run throughout jurisdictional
doctrines, it has become increasingly common to observe, along
with the Supreme Court, that “[j]urisdiction . . . is a word of many,
too many, meanings.”11 The concept of jurisdiction has been put
to so many diverse uses, and has been subjected to so many seemingly ad hoc exceptions, that scholars have begun to question
whether any meaningful content inheres in the concept at all.
These scholars have characterized the idealized conception of jurisdiction as a “dubious concept,”12 a rhetorical “trope,”13 and even
a “lie” (albeit, a “noble” one).14 Some have gone so far as to argue
that jurisdiction lacks any coherent conceptual identity, requiring
either a complete reconceptualization and redefinition or an acknowledgment that the term lacks any intrinsic substance
whatsoever.15
To an earlier generation of lawyers, the notion that jurisdiction lacks a coherent conceptual identity would have seemed peculiar. For centuries, the established and generally accepted
meaning of jurisdiction among lawyers in the common law tradition focused centrally on the power of a court to bind the parties
before it.16 This power-based view of jurisdiction continues to
provide the most widely accepted definition of the concept.17 But
10

See infra Part V.A.
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90 (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).
12 See generally Lee, supra note 4.
13 Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457,
1458 (2006).
14 Bloom, supra note 8, at 974–75.
15 Compare Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 634 (2017)
(proposing to redefine jurisdiction as any rule that “determines forum in a multiforum
system”) [hereinafter Jurisdiction and Its Effects], with Lee, supra note 4, at 1631 (urging
judges and lawyers to “stop making appeals to the ‘essential concept of jurisdiction’ or ‘the
nature of jurisdiction’”).
16 See supra note 3; see also, e.g., Gen. Inv. Co. v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228,
230 (1926) (“By jurisdiction we mean power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and
render a binding decision thereon.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657,
718 (1838) (“Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them. . . .
If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction.”); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 708 (1832) (“The power to hear
and determine a cause is jurisdiction.”).
17 See, e.g., Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “jurisdiction” as a “court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”); see also, e.g.,
11
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critics contend that this power-based conception, if it ever accurately characterized judicial practice, no longer functions as a tenable description of what “jurisdiction” means.18
Nearly all criticisms of the power-based conception of jurisdiction stem from the effects of the so-called bootstrap doctrine—
a doctrine recognizing that courts possess “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” and that such jurisdictional rulings are thus
entitled, in nearly all cases, to preclusive effect.19 The bootstrap
doctrine immunizes a judgment from collateral attack in subsequent proceedings, even if it becomes clear that the rendering
court lacked jurisdiction over the original proceeding.20 And because the bootstrap doctrine effectively validates judgments that
would be regarded as void under the traditional view, critics contend that power-based definitions cannot meaningfully serve to
distinguish “jurisdictional” rules from “nonjurisdictional” rules.21

Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S.Ct. 553, 560 (2017) (“A court of competent jurisdiction is a court with the power to adjudicate the case before it.”); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
94 (“‘Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” (quoting
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514)); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979)
(“[J]urisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case.” (emphasis in original)); Lumen N.
Mulligan, Federal Courts, Not Federal Tribunals, 104 NW. L. REV. 175, 189 n.95 (2010)
(“The [Supreme] Court and commentators define jurisdiction in terms of power with great
regularity. Indeed, it is the black letter view.”).
18 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 621 (“[T]he notion of jurisdiction as power cannot withstand scrutiny.”); Lee, supra note 4, at 1620 (contending that
“jurisdiction cannot truly be a matter of power”); Lees, supra note 13, at 1471 (“Since no
legal rule actually deprives a court of its ability to adjudicate . . . saying a rule is jurisdictional only when it goes to the court’s power is to say close to nothing.”).
19 The term was first used in a student note. See Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction:
The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1946); see also Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 69 n.208 (1994). The term
was later popularized by Professor Dan Dobbs in a series of articles defending the doctrine.
See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494 (1967). For a more recent
examination of the doctrine in its present form, see Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the
Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and
Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 317–18 (2011).
20 Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
21 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 627 (“Nor can jurisdiction
mean capacity to enter an enforceable judgment, for even a judgment entered without
jurisdiction can become binding, enforceable, and unassailable.” (citing Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 32 (1994))); Lee,
supra note 4, at 1619–20 (“If jurisdiction is power, does [the bootstrap] doctrine not permit
a court to create its own power by simply finding—erroneously—that it already possesses
the power? . . . So, jurisdiction cannot truly be a matter of power.”); cf. Dane, supra note 19,
at 113–14 (identifying “the expansion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” as “the
most important symptom of th[e] erosion” of the idea of jurisdiction).
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This Article defends the traditional, power-based conception
of jurisdiction as both theoretically coherent and normatively desirable. The equation of “jurisdiction” with a court’s power or
basic authority is deeply engrained in our legal history and culture and continues to provide a familiar starting point for most
discussions of the concept. And though the expansion of the bootstrap doctrine has complicated the picture significantly, a proper
understanding of that doctrine’s force and effect reveals that it
does not, in fact, render the power-based definition descriptively
implausible in the manner that critics maintain. Moreover, the
power-based conception of jurisdiction plays an important
functional role by enabling “jurisdictional” rules to allocate decision-making authority between and among various actors and
institutions. Such rules defining the outer boundaries of courts’
adjudicatory authority are a necessary feature of the adjudicative
process. And “jurisdiction” provides a convenient and widely accepted designation for describing this category of rules.
Part I begins by examining what the equation of jurisdiction
with power actually means. Although various formulations of the
jurisdiction-as-power concept have been proposed, the most useful and descriptively plausible definition equates “jurisdiction”
with a court’s distinctively legal authority to change the legal
rights and responsibilities of affected individuals. Understood in
this way, “jurisdiction” connotes the distinctively legal power of
the court to effectively make new law—embodied in the court’s
final judgment—that will govern the rights and obligations of the
parties who appear before it with respect to the particular subject
matter in dispute.
Part II examines the complications introduced by the bootstrap doctrine. Though the recognition of “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” complicates the power-based conception, it
does not render the definition either incoherent or descriptively
implausible. The bootstrap doctrine specifies a framework for
later courts to use in determining whether the conditions necessary to the existence of a rendering court’s adjudicative power actually existed. And though this framework will sometimes validate exercises of jurisdiction where those conditions were not, in
fact, satisfied, it does not change the nature or significance of the
power-conferring rules themselves. Most significantly, knowledge
of how a later court is likely to view the validity of a judgment
brought before it collaterally need not and should not affect the
decision of the rendering court regarding the existence of its own
jurisdiction.
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Part III considers how the power-based conception allows jurisdictional rules to serve their core function of allocating decision-making authority among different institutions and actors. In
addition to allocating power between different adjudicative institutions within a particular legal system, jurisdictional rules also
help to allocate decision-making authority in various other ways,
including allocating authority between different legal systems, allocating authority across time, and allocating authority between
courts and other types of institutions, such as legislative and executive bodies. Although other types of rules can serve similar allocative functions, the distinctive qualities and characteristics of
jurisdictional rules (conceived of as rules defining the scope and
limits of a court’s power) constrain and limit judicial actors in
ways that other types of legal rules might not.
Part IV turns to jurisdiction’s effects. Jurisdictional rules are
closely associated with a particular set of legal effects, including
a strong presumption that such rules are mandatory, nonwaivable, nonforfeitable, and not excusable as a matter of judicial
discretion or equity.22 But a closer look at what jurisdiction-aspower actually means reveals that many of these effects are not
necessarily essential features of jurisdiction and that many rules
widely recognized as “jurisdictional” in nature do not share all
such characteristics.
At the same time, the power-based understanding of jurisdiction suggests that there are at least some essential features of
jurisdictional rules that cannot be avoided.23 First, a court that
lacks jurisdiction necessarily lacks the power to bind the parties
to a final, claim-preclusive judgment that will determine the full
extent of their legal rights and responsibilities in subsequent
proceedings. Second, a conclusion that a particular condition or
limitation is jurisdictional necessarily implies that a court must—
at least implicitly—answer the question of whether that condition
or limitation is satisfied, before purporting to conclusively settle
the rights and responsibilities of the parties who appear before it.
Finally, and relatedly, a conclusion that particular rules are jurisdictional in character necessarily implies that a court must
conclude—either in fact or by operation of law—that such rules
were complied with before recognizing the legitimacy of a final
judgment entered by the court that purported to exercise
jurisdiction.

22
23

See Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 629.
See infra Part IV.B.
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Part V turns to the implications of the power-based conception of jurisdiction for judicial practice. First, a clearer understanding of what jurisdiction actually is should help to guide interpreters seeking to classify particular doctrines or rules as
either “jurisdictional” or “nonjurisdictional” in nature. The federal judiciary has struggled with this classificatory question in
recent decades, proposing various definitions and frameworks to
distinguish between the two types of rules. A persisting tension
running through this line of doctrine has been the tension between an “idealized” conception of jurisdiction, which posits an
immutable core of defining features that render a rule jurisdictional versus a “positive” conception, which views “jurisdiction” as
simply a label that lawmakers may attach to any rule or limitation they choose.24 This Article sides with the idealists by urging
an understanding of jurisdiction that exists independently of the
prescriptions and labels any particular set of lawmakers chooses
to adopt. But the particular conception of jurisdiction defended in
this Article is comparatively thin, leaving lawmakers and courts
free to attach a broad range of consequences to “jurisdictional”
rules so long as those effects do not interfere with jurisdiction’s
core power-allocating function.25
Equating jurisdiction with power also has implications for
the doctrine surrounding the sequencing of jurisdictional decision-making. The Supreme Court has insisted that subject matter
jurisdiction constitutes a threshold issue that federal courts must
resolve before proceeding to adjudicate other, nonjurisdictional,
issues.26 But subsequent decisions have complicated this doctrine
by suggesting that cases may be resolved on at least some nonjurisdictional grounds even when questions going to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction remain unresolved.27 Understanding the
connection between jurisdiction and power helps to illuminate

24 See John F. Preis, Jurisdictional Idealism and Positivism, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1416, 1426–37 (2018).
25 Cf. Hybridizing Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 1457–72 (introducing the idea of “hybridized” rules that bear some characteristics of both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
rules).
26 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95 (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established
as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the
United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382)).
27 See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435–36 (2007)
(allowing the federal court to dismiss the case on the basis of forum non conveniens without
first resolving questions regarding the court’s subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1999) (allowing dismissal on the basis of personal jurisdiction without reaching the issue of subject matter jurisdiction).
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this line of doctrine and to identify the line separating permissible
nonjurisdictional bases for dismissal from those that should require a court to first determine that it actually possesses
jurisdiction.
Finally, understanding jurisdiction as power has potential
implications for separation-of-powers doctrines, including questions regarding the judiciary’s power to legitimately bind decision
makers in the political branches.
I. JURISDICTION AS (HOHFELDIAN) POWER
The first step toward a clearer understanding of the relationship between jurisdiction and power is to determine what it actually means to describe jurisdiction as “power.” A particularly
memorable and concise encapsulation of the idea was provided by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who declared that “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.”28 But, as with many of
Holmes’ pithy aphorisms, his equation of “jurisdiction” with
“physical power” obscures as much as it illuminates.29 Holmes
himself acknowledged that “in civilized times,” it was no longer
“necessary to maintain that [physical] power throughout proceedings properly begun.”30 And modern doctrine recognizes the power
of courts to bind parties who have never placed themselves within
those courts’ physical custody or control.31
Another possible sense of “power” equates power with “legitimate authority.”32 This account of “power” transcends the brute
fact of physical ability to coerce or control and asks instead
whether a particular exercise of authority would be regarded as
legitimate. For example, a police officer may have the physical
power to arrest an individual without any reasonable ground for
suspicion of lawbreaking. But such an arrest would not be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the officer’s authority, and it is

28

McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
Cf. Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in a Theater:” The Life and Times of Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 183–84 (2015)
(discussing criticisms of Holmes’s much more famous aphorism in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), which analogized a false shout of “fire in a crowded theater” to
other forms of constitutionally unprotected speech).
30 McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91.
31 See, e.g., Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550–51 (1947) (“A judgment of a court
having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res judicata, in the
absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained upon a default.” (quoting Riehle v.
Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 225 (1929))).
32 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 1620 (exploring the idea of “something like legitimate authority”); see also Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 627 (same).
29
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thus possible to speak colloquially of the officer as lacking the
“power” to make such arrests.33
Equating jurisdiction with legitimate authority seems somewhat more descriptively plausible than Holmes’s association of
the concept with physical power. But as multiple scholars have
observed, this definition fails to meaningfully distinguish “jurisdictional” rules from other types of rules that courts are obligated
to obey.34 A court that openly flouts rules designed to limit its
jurisdiction may well be seen to transgress the bounds of its legitimate authority. But so may a court that openly flouts nonjurisdictional rules of substantive or procedural law. It is not difficult
to imagine scenarios in which the flouting of nonjurisdictional
rules—for example, flipping a coin to decide a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence—might be seen as far more serious from
a legitimacy perspective than would the disregard of a technical
jurisdictional limitation.35
But there is another, distinctively legal sense of the term
“power” that seems closer to the traditional understanding of
what the equation of jurisdiction with power was originally designed to capture. This sense of power is illuminated by the wellknown scheme of jural relations developed by legal philosopher
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.36 Hohfeld famously sought to disambiguate the concept of “rights” by breaking rights claims down
into four paired sets of correlative jural relations: (1) claimright/duty relations, (2) privilege/no-right relations, (3) power/liability relations, and (4) disability/immunity relations.37 “Rules
about power” in Hohfeld’s schema “determine how individuals
may make changes in other rules . . . .”38 The possession of power
signifies that one possesses the legal authority to create, change,
or annul some other set of legal relations involving either himself

33

Lee, supra note 4, at 1616–17.
See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 627 (“[T]he formulation of
jurisdiction as legitimate authority renders it conceptually indistinguishable from the
many nonjurisdictional elements that also inform legitimate authority.”); Lee, supra
note 4, at 1620–21 (arguing that both jurisdiction and merits are relevant to legitimacy).
35 See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
27 (2009) (observing that flipping a coin to resolve a case is widely regarded as a serious
form of judicial misconduct).
36 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
37 Id. at 30.
38 John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review,
84 VA. L. REV. 333, 340 (1998).
34
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or one or more third parties through volitional conduct.39 For example, a landowner typically possesses “power,” in the Hohfeldian sense, to transform the cluster of entitlements associated with
ownership by selling the property to another person, thereby extinguishing myriad powers, claim-rights, immunities, and privileges formerly possessed by the seller with respect to the property
and creating new entitlements in the purchaser.40
To describe jurisdiction as “power” in the Hohfeldian sense
signifies that jurisdiction gives a court the legal ability to transform the jural relations of other individuals—their claim-rights,
duties, privileges, powers, disabilities, etc.41 Persons subject to the
court’s jurisdiction, in turn, are subject to a corresponding
Hohfeldian “liability” to have their legal rights determined by the
court’s judgment. Once a judgment has been rendered by a court
possessing jurisdiction, the legal rights and responsibilities of the
party against whom the judgment was entered are no longer what
they had been before the judgment. Rather, the judgment itself
supplies a new source of legal rights and obligations that governs
the parties’ respective entitlements with respect to the subject
matter of the litigation going forward.42
This Hohfeldian account of jurisdiction as power seems plausible as a description of how jurisdiction actually functions in our
legal system. Consider, for example, a standard tort suit arising

39

Hohfeld, supra note 36, at 44.
See Harrison, supra note 38, at 340 (“For private law, classic examples of rules
about power are those that determine how property interests may be transferred and how
contracts may be formed.”).
41 See, e.g., Ori Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 99, 107–08
(2015) (discussing the power that courts possess as an example of Hohfeldian power); Robert G. Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 37, 38
(1967) (“Jurisdiction, within Hohfeld’s terminology, describes a power.”).
42 This distinctively legal sense of the term “power” also helps to clarify the connection between jurisdiction and legitimacy discussed above. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. As Professor Richard Fallon has observed, “legitimacy” is a multifaceted
concept that can be measured against multiple sets of criteria, including legal, sociological,
and moral standards. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2005). Jurisdiction is most relevant to assessing the distinctively legal
legitimacy of a court’s decision—i.e., whether the decision was lawful or legally authorized.
See id. at 1794–95. As Fallon notes, not every legal error calls the legal legitimacy of a
judicial decision into question. See id. at 1817–18 (“Virtually no one would characterize
every judicial ruling reversed on appeal as legally illegitimate.”). But because jurisdictional errors bear on the legal power of the court, such errors may provide a per se basis
for challenging the legal legitimacy of the court’s rulings. See id. at 1819 (“[A] claim of
judicial legitimacy characteristically suggests that a court,” among other things, “had lawful power to decide the case or issue before it.”). The possession of jurisdiction may thus
be a necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) condition for a judicial judgment to be
regarded as legally legitimate.
40
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from an automobile accident caused by the alleged negligence of
one of the drivers. Immediately after the accident, a driver who
was actually negligent may have a moral obligation to make
recompense for any injuries caused by his negligence but has no
immediate legal duty to compensate the injured party.43 Establishing such a legal duty would typically require the intervention
of a court possessing jurisdiction.44 The effect of a court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff would be to create a new set of legal
relationships between the plaintiff and the defendant, establishing a legal debt owed by the defendant and empowering the plaintiff to take measures to recover the amounts owed.45 Under the
doctrine of claim preclusion, the plaintiff’s legal entitlement to relief would be merged into the resulting judgment, while the judgment would serve as a bar to any effort to relitigate the same
claim in a later proceeding.46
Even if the driver was not in fact negligent or if his negligence
did not in fact cause the plaintiff’s injuries, a contrary determination by the court embodied in a final judgment would nonetheless
transform the parties’ legal rights and responsibilities.47 A person
whose rights or responsibilities were erroneously determined by
a court possessing jurisdiction may have an opportunity to appeal
to a hierarchically superior court; but once the judgment becomes
final, the affected parties would typically not be allowed to relitigate the issue in a subsequent proceeding.48 In this sense, jurisdiction can be seen to embody a limited “right to be wrong.”49 By
contrast, if the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the
43 See Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and
Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 137, 148 (2011) (“Upon the commission of a tort or the
breach of a contract, there is no duty to tender damages.”).
44 For a fuller discussion of the ways in which tort law empowers plaintiffs, see
Herstein, supra note 41, at 108–22.
45 Even after a judgment is rendered in a plaintiff’s favor, the defendant is typically
under no legal duty to pay damages; rather, the plaintiff is empowered to proceed against
the defendant’s property as a means of enforcement. See Oman, supra note 43, at 152–53.
46 See infra notes 255–271 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of claim
preclusion).
47 See, e.g., Herstein, supra note 41, at 112 (“[C]ourts hold the power to change the
legal rights and relations of litigants even in contradiction to the law and to the litigants’
valid and controlling rights, which the courts are obligated to apply.” (citing JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 137–38 (2d ed. 1990))).
48 See infra notes 255–271 and accompanying text.
49 See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities:
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 709 n.36 (1995) (“Jurisdiction is the
right to decide—either way—and thus, in effect, the right to be ‘wrong.’” (emphasis in
original)); see also, e.g., Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 49 Cal. 2d 764,
778 (1958) (“Jurisdiction, being the power to hear and determine, implies power to decide
a question wrong as well as right.”).
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widely accepted view is that it may not proceed to adjudicate the
merits of the underlying dispute at all.50
Understanding jurisdiction as Hohfeldian power also helps to
distinguish jurisdictional rules from other types of legal rules that
regulate judicial behavior. Though courts undoubtedly have a
duty to decide cases in accordance with applicable rules of substantive and procedural law, such rules do not purport to limit
courts’ authority in the way that jurisdictional rules do. Substantive and procedural rules provide criteria for courts to use in resolving contested questions affecting the parties’ rights and
responsibilities. Jurisdictional rules, on the other hand, “specify
whether a given tribunal has the authority to decide those” contested issues at all “and to bind the rest of the world to its
decision.”51
This connection between jurisdiction and legal power is
deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition. The relationship is encapsulated by the common law’s preferred Latinate expression for proceedings in which jurisdiction is lacking, coram
non judice—literally, before a person who is not a judge.52 Under
this conception, which was “ubiquitous in English practice”53 prior
to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution54 and persisted in U.S.
courts for more than a century thereafter,55 a judgment entered
by a court that lacked jurisdiction was regarded as a complete
legal nullity with no binding force or effect.56 Under this tradi-

50

See supra note 3.
Dane, supra note 19, at 22.
52 Coram non judice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also, e.g., Rose v.
Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808) (“If the court . . . had jurisdiction of the case, its
sentence is conclusive. If it had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are coram non judice, and
must be disregarded.”).
53 William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1828 (2008) (citing Case
of the Marshalsea (1613), 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.)).
54 Id. at 1826–28; see also Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional
Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 165–67 (1977) (discussing the background of the
common law voidness doctrine).
55 See Filling the Void, supra note 54, at 166–71 (describing the ascendance of the
voidness doctrine in American courts and its trajectory over the nineteenth century).
56 See, e.g., Voorhees v. Jackson ex dem. Bank of the United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
449, 474 (1836):
51

If not warranted by the constitution or law of the land, our most solemn proceedings can confer no right which is denied to any judicial act under colour of law,
which can properly be deemed to have been done coram non judice; that is, by
persons assuming the judicial function in the given case without lawful
authority.
See also Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395, 436 (N.Y. 1811) (“[W]here jurisdiction ends, the
judge also ceases to be a judge . . . .”).
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tional idea of jurisdiction, “th[e] judge or court” without jurisdiction is “in essence . . . no different from any person on the
street . . . She might wear a robe and wield a gavel. . . . But absent
jurisdiction . . . [t]he judge without jurisdiction might as well be
an imposter.”57
Of course, this somewhat idealized conception of jurisdiction
no longer fully describes the complexities of jurisdiction’s role in
our present legal system. As discussed above, the bootstrap doctrine and the idea of “jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction” have significantly complicated the ability of even this more limited conception of “power” to account for our actual institutional
practices.58 Any effort to restore power to its central role as a defining feature of jurisdiction must therefore account for the bootstrap doctrine and the significant inroads that doctrine has made
upon the traditional understanding of jurisdiction.
II. UNRAVELING THE “BOOTSTRAP” CONUNDRUM
The widespread acceptance of the bootstrap doctrine presents
the most significant challenge to the power-based conception of
jurisdiction. If a court can effectively create its own jurisdiction
by erroneously declaring that such jurisdiction exists, how is it
possible to meaningfully describe jurisdiction as a necessary precondition to the court’s exercise of power? This Part seeks to unravel this apparent conundrum. Part II.A begins with a brief
overview of the bootstrap doctrine’s intellectual origins and historical development.
Part II.B seeks to reconcile the bootstrap doctrine with the
power-based conception of jurisdiction by examining the distinctive roles the two concepts play in the adjudicative process.
Briefly, jurisdictional limits prescribe rules for courts to use in
determining whether they themselves possess the legal authority
to bind the parties to their judgments. But once a judgment has
been rendered, the bootstrap doctrine prescribes a different jurisdictional test for later courts to use in assessing the validity of the
earlier judgment. The notion that different jurisdictional standards apply to these two distinct stages of a litigation process
might seem jarring at first. But our law routinely requires particular institutional actors to accept as valid determinations made
by other actors without allowing any direct inquiry into the veracity of the earlier determinations.
57
58

Dane, supra note 19, at 23–24.
See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
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Part II.C briefly considers the value of distinguishing between power-conferring rules of the type to which the jurisdictional label is typically attached and other types of legal rules; it
then suggests reasons for believing that there is value in retaining the traditional distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules.
A. The Bootstrap Doctrine in Historical Context
The expansion of the bootstrap doctrine in the middle decades
of the twentieth century marked a significant innovation in thinking about jurisdiction.59 But the intellectual origins of the doctrine
stretch back much further to a set of doctrines originating in English law that distinguished courts of general jurisdiction from
those of more limited jurisdiction.60 In the English legal system,
the principle that a judgment entered by a court lacking jurisdiction was void and of no effect was used primarily to constrain the
power of courts of “inferior” jurisdiction.61 The factual bases for
the exercise of such courts’ jurisdiction would not be presumed by
later courts but rather had to be demonstrated on the face of the
record.62 Judgments entered by courts of general jurisdiction, by
contrast, enjoyed a presumption of validity and would not be set
aside based on a mere technical defect in the record.63
In the early decades after the Federal Constitution’s adoption, the Supreme Court confronted the implications of this English practice for determining the effects due to judgments
rendered by the “inferior” federal courts established by

59 See Filling the Void, supra note 54, at 174 (describing how a “series of [Supreme
Court] decisions between 1931 and 1963 . . . fundamentally altered the relationship between finality and judicial power in the United States”).
60 See id. at 165–66; see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of “Arising Under”
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 273–76 (2007) (discussing the division of authority between courts of general and limited jurisdiction).
61 See Filling the Void, supra note 54, at 166 (noting that “there seems to be no case
in which the judgment of one of the superior courts was held to be void”).
62 See, e.g., Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173, 179 (1809) (“If the
jurisdiction [of an inferior tribunal] does not appear upon the face of the proceedings, the
presumption of law is, that the court had not jurisdiction, and so the cause coram non
judice. In which case no valid judgment could be rendered.”); Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass. 641,
643 (1808) (“[W]e cannot presume any thing in favour of the jurisdiction of an inferior
magistrate, as it is not general, but given and limited by particular statutes.”).
63 See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Howard) 163, 173–74 (1834):

The only difference between the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, and
one of special and limited jurisdiction, is this: in the one case the jurisdiction of
the court is presumed, until the contrary appear; in the other, a party claiming
a right under it must know affirmatively that the court had jurisdiction.
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Article III.64 Despite the constitutional designation of such courts
as “inferior,” the Court held them to be courts of general jurisdiction whose judgments enjoyed the presumption of validity.65
While it was incumbent on the parties to establish the factual and
legal requisites necessary to invoke jurisdiction,66 the Court
would not allow a final judgment to be attacked collaterally based
on an alleged deficiency or ambiguity in the record.67 Some modern scholars have viewed these early decisions as an early appearance of the bootstrap principle in U.S. law.68 But as Professor
William Baude has observed, “[t]his may be reading [such] cases
for slightly more than they are worth,” since the Court did not
confront in the early cases any clear evidence that the rendering
court actually lacked jurisdiction.69 Rather, such decisions involved mere allegations that the factual bases supporting jurisdiction were not sufficiently disclosed by the record.70
In other doctrinal contexts, the Supreme Court endorsed the
traditional view that judgments rendered by courts that lacked
64 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”).
65 See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (“A Circuit Court,
though an inferior Court, in the language of the constitution, is not so in the language of
the common law . . . [and its proceedings] are entitled to as liberal intendments, or presumptions, in favour of their regularity, as those of any Supreme Court.” (emphasis in
original)).
66 See id. at 11:

A Circuit Court, however, is of limited jurisdiction; and has cognizance, not of
cases generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small
proportion of the cases, which an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace. And the
fair presumption is . . . that a cause is without its jurisdiction till the contrary
appears.
67 See, e.g., M’Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199–200 (1825) (noting
that a federal judgment could not be collaterally attacked even when the record was silent
on the question of jurisdiction).
68 See, e.g., Hybridizing Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 1454 n.89 (describing
M’Cormick as “[p]erhaps the first case articulating [the bootstrap] principle”); Michael G.
Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1859 (2007) (citing M’Cormick, 23 U.S. at 199, and Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 207 (1830), as support
for the proposition that “[j]urisdictionally defective [federal] judgments could be reversed
on appeal; but . . . were ‘not absolute nullities’ that might be disregarded on collateral
attack.”).
69 Baude, supra note 53, at 1830.
70 Id. State courts were often more explicit in recognizing the rebuttable nature of
the presumption in favor of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nulton v. Isaacs, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 726,
738–43 (1878) (holding a federal judgment void and of no effect after a state court concluded that the federal court lacked jurisdiction); Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill 130, 139 (N.Y.
1841) (“The distinction between superior and inferior courts is not of much importance in
this particular case, for whenever it appears that there was a want of jurisdiction, the
judgment will be void, in whatever court it was rendered.” (emphasis in original)).
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jurisdiction could be regarded by later courts as void and of no
legal effect. For example, although the legislation Congress
adopted to implement the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit
Clause was construed to make state-court judgments conclusive
in the courts of other states to the same extent they would be in
the courts of the rendering state,71 this principle did not limit the
ability of later courts to inquire into the rendering court’s jurisdiction.72 The Court explained this exception by reference to “the
international law as it existed among the States” at the time of
the federal statute’s adoption, which deemed “a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of
another,” to be “void within the foreign State, when the defendant
had not been served with process” within the rendering state or
voluntarily appeared to defend.73 The Court adopted a similar
view regarding the voidness of judgments entered by jurisdictionless courts in cases involving recognition of judgments rendered
by foreign courts74 and recognition of state court judgments by
federal courts.75
The first tentative moves toward the strong modern version
of the bootstrap doctrine began in the late nineteenth century.76
In Des Moines Navigation & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co.,77 the
Supreme Court extended its earlier precedents supporting a presumption in favor of a federal court’s jurisdiction by adopting
something close to a conclusive presumption, at least with respect
to certain matters.78 Des Moines Navigation involved a collateral

71

Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813).
See D’arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1851).
73 Id.
74 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808) (refusing to recognize a
French in rem judgment where the condemned property was not properly seized and thus
not brought within the French court’s jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Bischoff v. Wethered, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 814 (1869) (holding that the judgment of an English court that “was
wholly without jurisdiction of the person” had “no validity [in the United States], even of
a primâ facie character [and] is simply null”).
75 See, e.g., Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828):
72

[W]e cannot yield an assent to the proposition, that the jurisdiction of the [state
court] could not be questioned, when its proceedings were brought, collaterally,
before the [federal] Circuit Court. We know nothing in the organization of the
Circuit Courts of the Union, which can contradistinguish them from other
Courts, in this respect.
76 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle
(pt. I), 53 VA. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1967) (describing the bootstrap principle as having been
“discovered almost accidentally in the 19th century” but noting that there remained “considerable doubt as to its validity” for some time).
77 123 U.S. 552 (1887).
78 Id. at 558–59.

1736

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:7

attack on an earlier federal judgment in which jurisdiction had
been premised on alleged diversity of state citizenship.79 Unlike
the Court’s early nineteenth-century decisions, which had involved circumstances “where the record simply fail[ed] to show
jurisdiction,” the Des Moines Navigation case involved a charge
that the record itself demonstrated that “there could be no jurisdiction, because . . . one of the defendants, was a citizen of the
same State with the plaintiff.”80 Emphasizing that all of the parties had appeared during the initial proceeding and litigated voluntarily and that no objection had then been raised to the federal
court’s jurisdiction, the Court held that the prior judgment could
not “be deemed a nullity” but was rather “a valid and subsisting
prior adjudication of the matters in controversy, binding on the[]
parties.”81 The doctrinal significance of this holding was blunted
to some extent by later cases suggesting that this conclusive presumption attached only to certain types of “quasi-jurisdictional”
facts—such as allegations of diverse citizenship—leaving a potential role for the voidness doctrine in cases involving other types of
jurisdictional challenges.82
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Court expanded the bootstrap
doctrine dramatically. In Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s
Association,83 the Court held that a defendant who had appeared
in a federal court action to litigate the question of personal jurisdiction could not collaterally attack the court’s jurisdictional
determination in a later proceeding.84 The Court explained its decision by reference to the broad public interest in finality of judicial proceedings:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the
result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case where
one voluntarily appears, presents his case, and is fully heard,
and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter
79

Id. at 553–56.
Id. at 558.
81 Id. at 559.
82 See, e.g., Noble v. Union Logging Co., 147 U.S. 165, 173–74 (1893) (distinguishing
“quasi-jurisdictional” facts, such as the existence of diverse citizenship, from the types of
facts essential to give a court’s judgment validity, such as “the service of process within
the State upon the defendant in a common law action” or “the seizure and possession of
the res within the bailiwick in a proceeding in rem”).
83 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
84 Id. at 525–26.
80
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concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has
submitted his cause.85
Baldwin was amenable to a narrow interpretation given personal jurisdiction’s status as a waivable defense and the Court’s
prior case law establishing that a special appearance to contest
jurisdiction could permissibly be deemed to waive jurisdictional
objections.86 Over the next decade, however, the Court extended
Baldwin’s finality rationale to bar most collateral challenges alleging defects in subject matter jurisdiction as well.87 This line of
doctrine culminated in the Court’s 1963 decision in Durfee v.
Duke,88 which laid down the general rule that a prior judgment is
ordinarily entitled to full preclusive effect “even as to questions of
jurisdiction,” when “the second court’s inquiry discloses that those
questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided
in the court which rendered the original judgment.”89
The expansion of the bootstrap doctrine greatly reduced the
practical significance of the earlier developed doctrine treating jurisdictionless judgments as void and of no legal effect. But it did
not supplant the voidness principle entirely. In discrete legal areas, the Supreme Court has continued to allow judgments to be
collaterally attacked based on an asserted lack of jurisdiction by
the rendering court, including in cases brought against the
United States or federal Indian tribes90 and cases decided by state
courts in contravention of a federal statutory bar on jurisdiction.91
The Court’s doctrinal innovations have coalesced into the
somewhat “peculiar” doctrine of “jurisdiction-to-determinejurisdiction,” which bears some resemblance to more traditional
preclusion doctrines—such as claim preclusion and issue preclusion—without perfectly mirroring either.92 In most cases, the doctrine treats the judicial interest in finality as more important
than the countervailing interest in judgment validity, prohibiting
collateral attacks on the large majority of judgments issued by

85

Id.
See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 20–21 (1890).
87 See, e.g., Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377
(1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 74–78 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165, 172–77 (1938).
88 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
89 Id. at 111.
90 United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1940).
91 Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438–40 (1940).
92 Clermont, supra note 19, at 318 (describing jurisdiction as “constitut[ing] a third
body of res judicata law distinguishable from claim and issue preclusion, or perhaps a body
of law standing separate from res judicata”).
86
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state or federal courts.93 But the doctrine leaves open the possibility for challenges in truly egregious cases, such as where the rendering court “plainly” lacked subject matter jurisdiction or where
the judgment “substantially” infringed on the authority of another decision maker.94
The bootstrap doctrine has thus largely, though not quite
entirely, supplanted the earlier doctrine allowing judgments rendered without jurisdiction to be collaterally attacked. Whereas
the presumptive invalidity of such judgments constituted the general rule from our nation’s founding through the early decades of
the twentieth century, the bootstrap principle has now entrenched itself as the general rule governing judgment recognition with the traditional common law voidness doctrine reduced
to a vestigial exception applicable to only a narrow subset of
cases.
B. Jurisdiction as Power and the Bootstrap Doctrine
Can the traditional conception of jurisdiction as power be reconciled with the bootstrap doctrine’s preeminence in our current
law governing judgment recognition? Critics of power-based theories of jurisdiction think not. These critics argue that the undeniable reality that judgments rendered by jurisdictionless courts
will be recognized as valid by later decision makers renders
power-based definitions descriptively implausible.95
From a certain perspective, this criticism makes sense. If one
conceives of “law” as merely a set of predictions about how officials are likely to respond to particular events,96 it might seem
reasonable to conclude that a judge who lacks jurisdiction nonetheless possesses the “power” to bind the parties so long as we are
reasonably confident that her judgment will be treated as valid
93 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON
ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 264 (2001) (explaining that, where a jurisdictional
determination is challenged collaterally, “the desire for finality generally outweighs the
concern for validity, giving the determination preclusive effect” in later litigation).
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (acknowledging limited grounds
for a collateral attack on a court’s determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction in
a contested action, including situations where “[t]he subject matter of the action was so
plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest
abuse of authority” or where “[a]llowing the judgment to stand would substantially
infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government”).
95 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)
(“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what
I mean by the law.”); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE,
128–32 (1995) (describing the role of prediction in legal realist thought).
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by later courts.97 But this is hardly the only perspective from
which to view the problem. As decades of legal scholarship has
recognized, it is also possible to view law and legal obligation from
the point of view of officials who conscientiously seek to follow
applicable legal rules.98 Unlike “external” perspectives, which focus on observable regularities of behavior produced by or associated with legal rules, this “internal” point of view focuses on the
normative force that legal rules exert on the decision-making of
those who accept them as a standard of conduct.99
Understanding how the bootstrap doctrine can be reconciled
with the traditional power-based conception of jurisdiction from
this “internal” perspective starts with the Hohfeldian conception
of jurisdiction as power sketched above in Part I. As discussed
above, equating jurisdiction with Hohfeldian power means that
jurisdiction constitutes a court’s lawful authority to change the
legal relationships of the parties who appear before it with respect
to the specific subject matter of the lawsuit.100 In effect, the court’s
judgment establishes a new source of law that determines the
applicability of more general legal directives to the specific circumstances of the parties’ dispute.101 Of course, this case-specific
judgment does not alter the more general legal principles that the
court applies any more than an umpire’s erroneous conclusion
that a particular runner was “safe” rather than “out” alters the
rules of baseball.102 Such a judgment does, however, conclusively
bind the parties and thus, with respect to those parties and the
97 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 1619 (arguing that the bootstrap doctrine “permit[s]
a court to create its own power by simply finding—erroneously—that it already possesses
the power”).
98 See Charles L. Barzun, Inside/Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in
Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1207–09 (2015) (tracing the origin of the distinction between “internal” and “external” perspectives on law to the work of H.L.A. Hart in
the 1960s); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88–91 (3d ed. 2012) (articulating
the distinction).
99 HART, supra note 98, at 88–89; see also, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal
Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2006) (“As Hart used the term, the internal point of view refers to the practical attitude of rule acceptance. Someone takes this
attitude towards a social rule when he accepts or endorses a convergent pattern of behavior as a standard of conduct.”).
100 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
101 See Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REV. 527, 562 (2019) (“A judgment
is certainly a source of law in a particular case.” (emphasis in original)); Herstein, supra
note 41, at 111–12 (discussing the lawmaking effect of judgments).
102 Cf. HART, supra note 98, at 142 (emphasis in original):

[T]he scorer’s determinations . . . are unchallengeable. In this sense it is true
that for the purposes of the game ‘the score is what the scorer says it is.’ But it
is important to see that the scoring rule remains . . . and it is the scorer’s duty
to apply it as best he can.
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subject matter in dispute, displaces any more generally applicable legal standards.103
When conceived of in this way, jurisdictional rules can be
seen as an example of what Professors Matthew Adler and
Michael Dorf have described as “existence conditions”—i.e., the
necessary pre-conditions that must be satisfied in order for some
claimed source of law to be recognized as an actual instance of the
type of law it is claimed to be.104 As an example of an existence
condition, Adler and Dorf point to Section 7 of Article I in the
Federal Constitution, which sets forth the procedures for enacting
federal statutes.105 A proposed enactment that fails to comply with
those procedures—for example, by not being presented to the
President for signature or by failing to be passed by both Houses
of Congress—simply fails to become law. A federal court would be
entitled (and likely obligated) to disregard such a putative “law,”
notwithstanding its general obligation to apply all validly enacted
federal statutes.106
Jurisdiction performs a similar function. Jurisdictional rules
identify the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a particular type of claimed “law”—namely, a judicial judgment—to be
recognized as the type of law it claims to be. Under the traditional
view, a judgment rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction
could be regarded as “mere waste paper, an absolute nullity” that
could be “said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or
effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody.”107
But not all actors or institutions need to use the same method
or apply the same criteria to determine whether a particular
existence condition has been satisfied. Rather, as Adler and Dorf

103

Herstein, supra note 41, at 112:

When [ ] judicial misapplication or deviation from the law occurs, the legal system comes to contain two contradictory legal norms, and until such erroneous
rulings are overruled or their applicability is suspended by the court, the litigants are bound to the specific judicially created norm that is individually directed at them.
104 See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2003).
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
106 Adler & Dorf, supra note 104, at 1122 (contending that “[a] judicial duty to take
account of some type of law, in adjudicating cases, entails a duty to enforce constitutional
provisions that state existence conditions for that type of law” (emphasis omitted)).
107 Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1013 (Tex. Civ. App., Fort Worth, 1938)
(quoting 25 TEX. JUR. § 254, at 693); see also, e.g., Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
449, 475 (1836) (describing a jurisdictionless judgment as “waste paper”).
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observe, “existence conditions can be institution-specific, or perspectival,” in that the test for whether the condition has been satisfied may be different for different actors or institutions.108
Consider, for example, the “enrolled bill doctrine,” which supplies the test that federal courts use to determine whether the
constitutionally specified requirements for congressional lawmaking have been satisfied.109 In the leading case establishing
this doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the “signing by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill,” should “be deemed
complete and unimpeachable” once the enrolled bill is “deposited
in the public archives.”110
The criteria that federal courts must look to under the enrolled-bill doctrine (i.e., whether an enrolled bill was signed by
the President and the leaders of both Houses of Congress and deposited in the public archives) differ from those prescribed by
Section 7 of Article I (i.e., whether a particular bill was actually
assented to by majorities in both Houses and either signed by the
President or reenacted by supermajorities in both Houses following a veto).111 But the enrolled-bill doctrine does not purport to
replace or supplant the constitutional criteria or to empower officials to enact a bill through procedures other than those specified
by Section 7.112 Rather, the doctrine merely reflects an evidentiary
presumption that a bill attested to in the manner identified by
the Court has, in fact, been approved through the constitutionally
required methods.113 Thus, Section 7 continues to supply the criteria that other institutional actors—including congressional
leaders and the President—must use in determining whether a
bill was validly enacted into law, even though federal courts will

108

Adler & Dorf, supra note 104, at 1127 (emphasis in original).
See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking
the “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 328–31 (2009) (describing the origins and
justifications for the enrolled-bill doctrine as well as its present significance).
110 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).
111 See Adler & Dorf, supra note 104, at 1173 (observing that the Court in Field “did
not gainsay” § 7’s requirement of actual majority approval by both Houses of Congress).
112 See Field, 143 U.S. at 669:
109

There is no authority in the presiding officers of the House of Representatives
and the Senate to attest by their signatures, not in the President to approve, nor
in the Secretary of State to receive and cause to be published, as a legislative
act, any bill not passed by Congress.
113 Id. at 673 (describing the effect of the required attestations on a bill and its enrollment in the public archives as “conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress,
according to the forms of the Constitution”).
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look only to the particular assurances of enactment prescribed by
the enrolled-bill doctrine.114
Likewise, the bootstrap doctrine does not purport to displace
ordinary jurisdictional rules that constrain the rendering courts’
authority or to empower such courts to bind parties without jurisdiction. Rather, the bootstrap doctrine reflects a set of criteria for
later courts to use in determining whether the relevant jurisdictional conditions were actually satisfied. As with the enrolled-bill
doctrine, the selection of these criteria is driven by a set of pragmatic concerns regarding efficiency, finality, and respect for coordinate decision makers.115
The bootstrap doctrine may sometimes require later courts to
act as if a judgment that failed to satisfy the actual conditions
necessary for validity is in fact valid, just as the enrolled-bill doctrine might sometimes require courts to act as if a bill that failed
to satisfy the requisite constitutional criteria was duly enacted.116
But such “as if” exceptions are a familiar part of our law. 117 Doctrines such as claim and issue preclusion, horizontal and vertical
stare decisis, and the political-question doctrine routinely require
courts to accept determinations made by some other authoritative
decision maker as conclusive.118 But the application of such doctrines is not generally understood as altering or displacing the
underlying legal rules to which they apply.119

114 Id. at 672 (declaring that an enrolled act that “ha[s] the official attestations of”
congressional leaders and the president “carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments . . . that it was passed by Congress” in the constitutionally prescribed manner and that the “judicial department” must “act upon that assurance, and [ ] accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated”).
115 See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 109, at 330–31 (discussing justifications for the
enrolled-bill doctrine, including respect for the authority of coordinate branches and the
promotion of judicial efficiency).
116 See id. at 331–33 (discussing an example of such binding effect being given to a
purported statute).
117 See Sachs, supra note 101, at 561–63 (discussing the prevalence of such “as if” legal
exceptions).
118 See id. at 561–62 (discussing preclusion and stare decisis as examples of “as if”
rules); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 US 224, 240 (1993) (White, J., concurring)
(“[T]he issue in the political question doctrine is not whether the constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental function to one of the political
branches” but rather “whether the Constitution has given one of the political branches
final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature of such a power.” (emphasis in
original)).
119 For example, a court may be required to conclude that a particular plaintiff is
barred from relief under a particular law based on the preclusive effect of a prior judgment
even if an identically circumstanced litigant who was not a party to the earlier case could
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Putting the pieces together, we can see that the bootstrap
doctrine does not render jurisdiction-as-power incoherent or descriptively implausible in the manner that critics suggest. Rather, jurisdiction-as-power and the bootstrap doctrine supply different criteria for different decision makers at different stages of
the adjudicatory process. From the perspective of the rendering
court, the applicable jurisdictional rules supply the criteria of legal validity. If a judge on such a court were to conclude that not
all applicable jurisdictional conditions had been satisfied, she
would lack any authority to bind the parties. All that would be
left to do would be to dismiss the case.120 But from the perspective
of a later court called upon to recognize an earlier court’s putative
judgment, the criteria of validity would be supplied instead by the
bootstrap doctrine. That doctrine requires the recognizing court
to defer, in nearly all circumstances, to the rendering court’s determination regarding its own jurisdiction, even if that determination were erroneous.
C. Why It Matters
Knowing that it is possible to conceptualize jurisdiction as
power notwithstanding the bootstrap doctrine’s preeminence is
not the end of the story. Even if such a conceptualization is possible, one might reasonably ask whether we should continue to
equate jurisdiction with power or whether some alternative conceptualization might be preferable. For example, Professor Scott
Dodson has suggested that existing definitions of jurisdiction

recover under the exact same law. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Likewise, a district judge adjudicating a case in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland may be obligated to interpret the Fourth Amendment in accordance with the
precedent established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; but that same
judge, if sitting by designation on a panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, would be free to reach a contrary conclusion. Cf. 28 U.S. Code § 292(d) (authorizing
the Chief Justice to temporarily assign district judges to a court of appeals in another
circuit). And though lower courts are strictly bound by Supreme Court precedent, the
Court has also acknowledged that its own decisions may sometimes reflect an incorrect
view of the underlying law. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (instructing that lower courts should not attempt to anticipate
an overruling of Supreme Court precedent, while acknowledging that the Court itself may
overrule an earlier decision in order “to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation of
statutory language”); cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (describing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as “gravely wrong the day it
was decided”).
120 Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is power
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869))).
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should be replaced with a new definition that would limit the “jurisdictional” label to rules that “determine[ ] forum in a multiforum system.”121 Dodson argues that this new definition would
avoid the confusion that has grown up around the “jurisdictional”
label while allowing the concept to still play a meaningful role in
“help[ing] [to] allocate cases, define boundaries, and maintain relationships among competing forums.”122 The possibility of alternative definitions, such as Dodson’s, requires some consideration
of the power-based definition’s continued usefulness.
One argument in favor of the power-based definition is
grounded in longstanding historical practice and usage. As already noted, the equation of jurisdiction with a court’s power or
basic authority has predominated in Anglo-American law for centuries and continues to function as the most prominent definition
in current use.123 In view of this longstanding and widely accepted
usage, it seems reasonable to place the burden of justification
upon those seeking a redefinition. One way to meet that burden
might be to show that existing definitions are conceptually incoherent or descriptively implausible.124 But if, as argued above, jurisdiction-as-power is not rendered incoherent or implausible by
the widespread acceptance of the bootstrap doctrine, this particular argument no longer suffices as a justification for redefinition.
A second reason for continuing to conceive of jurisdiction as
power might be grounded in considerations of convenience. If jurisdictional rules are conceived of as existence conditions in the
manner described above,125 then such rules are practically unavoidable. In order for courts to fulfill their institutional function,
there must be some rules to define those courts’ power and authority. At a minimum, we need some criteria to distinguish a
judge clothed with the lawful authority of the state from a bathrobe-clad eccentric wielding a croquet mallet as a gavel.126 But

121

Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 634.
Id.
123 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at
1615 (“Our legal culture insists that there does exist an essential quality making jurisdiction unique—power.”).
124 This is the tack taken by most leading skeptics of the power-based definition of
jurisdiction. See supra note 21.
125 See supra Part II.
126 Cf. John Harrison, Power, Duty, and Facial Invalidity, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501,
523–24 (2013) (“Legal rules identify individuals as judges, constitute courts out of judges,
and establish the jurisdiction of courts. . . . In order to perform their function, the United
States Marshalls must be able to distinguish judges from imposters, and legal rules make
that distinction.”).
122
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even after we know which individuals are judges and which institutions are courts, we still need some criteria for determining
which questions such courts are entitled to answer, which individuals’ rights and responsibilities may be altered or determined
by such courts, and how different courts and legal systems relate
to one another and to other official decision makers. The “jurisdictional” label has traditionally been attached to rules that address the latter issue. And maintaining that label seems far more
convenient than coming up with a new, alternative nomenclature.
Of course, arguments of this sort assume the continuing utility of distinguishing rules that purport to limit courts’ power from
other types of rules that courts are obliged to follow. Under the
traditional view, the utility of this distinction was obvious, as only
judgments rendered by courts that lacked jurisdiction would be
vulnerable to collateral attack. The bootstrap doctrine has complicated this picture by allowing for the validation of most jurisdictionless judgments. But the prospect that judgments properly
deemed void under the applicable jurisdictional rules are likely—
even very likely—to be treated as valid by later decision makers
does not necessarily render the distinction between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” rules irrelevant.
The continuing utility of jurisdiction in the face of a validating rule like the bootstrap doctrine would be most obvious in a
system of “acoustic separation” in which courts rendering judgments acted in complete ignorance of the standard that recognizing courts would use to determine whether those judgments were
valid.127 In such a hypothetical world, those responsible for designing the rules that govern the power and authority of the
courts might plausibly see value in designing two different sets of
criteria for determining judgment validity. For courts responsible
for adjudicating cases and rendering judgments in the first instance, rule makers might well have an interest in encouraging
the belief that any decision taken in the absence of—or in excess
of—their legally specified jurisdiction will be void and of no legal
effect. Such a rule might encourage courts to scrupulously adhere
to the limits placed on their decisional authority, thereby facilitating the allocation of decisional responsibilities preferred by the
lawmakers. The traditional voidness doctrine largely tracked this
design choice.

127 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1984).
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But when considering the criteria to be used by later courts
called upon to recognize or enforce those earlier courts’ judgments, the lawmakers might well prefer a different balance. Once
the issue of jurisdiction has been fully considered and determined
by a person authorized to serve as a judge, the lawmakers might
plausibly conclude that the interests in certainty, finality, and judicial efficiency would be better served by a rule that validates all
but the most egregious or exceptional jurisdictional errors, resulting in something like the current bootstrap doctrine.128
In the real world, no such acoustic separation is possible.
Courts are called upon both to render judgments and to recognize
prior judgments, and no clean institutional separation of these
functions seems practicable or desirable. Judges will thus always
have knowledge of the validation criteria prescribed to both rendering courts and recognizing courts. But such knowledge need
not be fatal to the practical division of validation criteria sketched
above. Despite the significant inroads made by the bootstrap doctrine, “the judicial attitude to jurisdiction retains both the rhetoric and the psychology of power and powerlessness.”129 It is thus
possible that courts continue to perceive jurisdiction as a genuine
limit on their decisional authority, notwithstanding their
knowledge that later courts will apply a different test of judgment
validity.
This is more than just possible; anyone who has followed the
workings of the federal courts with any degree of attentiveness
has seen it done repeatedly.130 More than three-quarters of a century after the bootstrap doctrine’s ascendance in U.S. law, federal
courts remain scrupulously attentive to the jurisdictional limits
placed on their own authority, at least when a jurisdictional obstacle is revealed on direct review rather than presented in a
collateral attack.131

128 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing policy rationales for the
bootstrap principle).
129 Dane, supra note 19, at 120.
130 Cf. TOM QUIRK, MARK TWAIN AND HUMAN NATURE 1 (2013) (describing the possibly apocryphal quote attributed to Mark Twain in response to a question about his belief
in infant baptism: “Believe in it? Hell, I’ve seen it done!”).
131 See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95 (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of
the United States and is inflexible and without exception.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
379, 382 (1884))); Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 496 (2016) (“Neither party contests
our jurisdiction to review [the plaintiff’s] claims, but we ‘have an independent obligation
to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge
from any party.’” (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006))).
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Moreover, there may be a practical benefit to encouraging
courts to focus on issues of power and powerlessness in the way
that the traditional conception of jurisdiction prescribes. In some
respects, a court’s duty to adhere to the rules that limit and regulate its jurisdiction are similar to those that regulate the parties’
substantive rights and relationships with one another and the
procedures that courts should use in processing claims. A court
that makes a mistake about substantive or procedural law—as all
courts at least sometimes will—may erroneously deprive the parties of entitlements they would have expected in a world where
perfectly accurate decision-making were possible.
The same is true of a court that makes an error regarding its
jurisdiction. But a court that purports to adjudicate a claim over
which it lacks jurisdiction has done something more. Such a court
has claimed an authority that does not belong to it and usurped
an authority that belongs somewhere else.132 Even a court that
reaches an accurate determination of every substantive and procedural issue in the case before it has still behaved wrongfully.133
Far from possessing the “right to be wrong” that characterizes jurisdiction, such courts do “not even have the right to be right.”134
This emphasis on power and powerlessness, on authority and
usurpation, has particular significance for one of jurisdiction’s
principal institutional functions—namely, the allocation of decision-making authority across different actors and institutions.135
As the following Part will show, defining jurisdiction as power
helps to reinforce jurisdiction’s allocative functions by encouraging courts to be attentive to, and to work within, the legally prescribed boundaries of their authorized decision-making authority.
132 The connection between “jurisdiction” and “usurpation” is nearly as deeply rooted
in judicial rhetoric as the connection between jurisdiction and power. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 35 (1906) (“This court, while sustaining
the subordinate courts of the United States in the exercise of such jurisdiction as has been
lawfully conferred upon them, must see to it that they do not usurp authority not affirmatively given to them by acts of Congress.”); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351–
52 (1871) (“Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority
exercised is a usurped authority.”); Hickey’s Lessee v. Stewart, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 750, 762
(1845) (“[N]o power having been conferred by Congress, on that court, to take or exercise
jurisdiction . . . the exercise of jurisdiction was a mere usurpation of judicial power.”).
133 See, e.g., Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 334 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797)
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (“A jurisdiction assumed without authority, would be equally an
usurpation, whether exercised wisely, or unwisely.”).
134 Dane, supra note 19, at 23.
135 See, e.g., Lees, supra note 13, at 1488 (“For the most part, jurisdictional rules embody a deeply seated political principle of governance, namely that law-speaking authority
is divided and distributed to multiple law-speaking institutions and that those institutions
ought to be kept separate from one another.”).
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III. THE ALLOCATIVE FUNCTIONS OF JURISDICTION
The idea that jurisdiction is closely related to the allocation
of decision-making authority is hardly novel. Contests over the
allocation of decision-making authority informed the development of the voidness principle in early English law and contributed to its vitality in early U.S. jurisprudence.136 And multiple
modern commenters have suggested that allocation can serve as
a useful guiding principle for distinguishing jurisdictional rules
from other types of legal rules.137 Missing from these accounts,
however, is a full appreciation of the distinctive ways in which
jurisdiction’s connection to judicial power helps to facilitate jurisdiction’s allocative functions. This Part aims to examine the connection between the power-based conception of jurisdiction’s identity and the allocation of decision-making authority by examining
four distinct ways in which jurisdictional rules allocate power
across decision-making institutions: (1) allocations among forums
within a particular legal system, (2) allocations between forums
in different legal systems (particularly across national boundaries), (3) allocations across time, and (4) allocations between
courts and other types of decision-making institutions, such as
legislatures and executive officials.
A. Allocations Among Forums Within a Legal System
One important function of jurisdictional rules is to allocate
decision-making authority among different forums within a particular legal system. This function is so central to jurisdiction’s
practical significance that Professor Dodson suggests that it
should replace the power-centered conception as the defining feature of jurisdiction as a legal concept.138 Dodson’s proposed redefinition is both overinclusive and underinclusive when measured against currently accepted usage of the “jurisdictional”

136 See Filling the Void, supra note 54, at 165–68 (discussing royal courts’ competition
with local and ecclesiastical courts in England and jurisdictional conflicts between early
U.S. state courts as influences in the development and continued vitality of the voidness
doctrine).
137 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 634 (suggesting that “jurisdiction” be redefined to mean any rule that “determines forum in a multiforum system”);
Lees, supra note 13, at 1478 (proposing that the jurisdictional label should be applied to
the “rules and requirements play a role in shaping th[e] boundaries” of “an institution’s
authority with respect to other institutions”).
138 Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 634.
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label.139 But it does signal the importance of jurisdictional rules
and limitations as at least one important device through which
power is channeled within a given legal system.
Consider the various ways in which jurisdictional rules divide decision-making authority within the U.S. legal system. The
U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
nine specifically enumerated heads of jurisdiction.140 The jurisdiction of the federal courts is further constrained by Congress,
which possesses and has exercised the power to prescribe jurisdictional limits on the federal courts beyond those specified by the
Constitution.141
An important function of the limited scope of federal jurisdiction is to preserve a domain of decision-making autonomy for the
state courts.142 The limited nature of the Constitution’s delegation
of federal judicial power has led federal courts to presume their
own lack of jurisdiction unless and until it is affirmatively demonstrated by the parties.143 These limitations are buttressed by a
number of subsidiary doctrines, such as those treating objections
to federal subject matter jurisdiction as nonwaivable, nonforfeitable, and not amenable to discretionary or equitable relief by the
courts.144 These limiting principles, along with judicially devel-

139 Id. at 635–36 (acknowledging that his proposed definition would classify as nonjurisdictional some doctrines that are conventionally regarded as jurisdictional and as jurisdictional some doctrines that are conventionally regarded as nonjurisdictional).
140 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
141 Congress’s authority to make “exceptions and regulations” to the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction is expressly recognized in the text of Article III. U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 2. Congress’s control over the jurisdiction of the federal district courts and intermediate appellate courts is inferred as a corollary of its more general power to determine
whether or not to establish such courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the “judicial
Power of the United States” in the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”); see also, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from
any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created
by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).
142 See HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM xi (1953) (“The jurisdiction of courts in a federal system is an aspect of
the distribution of power between the states and the federal government.”).
143 See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the federal courts’] limited jurisdiction and the
burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (citations
omitted)); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (“A circuit court [ ] is of
limited jurisdiction. . . . And the fair presumption is . . . that a cause is without its jurisdiction, till the contrary appears.”).
144 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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oped discretionary doctrines allowing courts to decline the exercise of jurisdiction in limited circumstances,145 leave a substantial
amount of the nation’s judicial business in the hands of the state
courts.146
A further allocation of decision-making authority is reflected
in the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction in
the federal system. By limiting parties’ ability to seek relief from
trial court rulings prior to entry of a final judgment,147 the limited
nature of appellate jurisdiction allows trial courts the freedom to
revisit and revise their interlocutory orders and protects appellate courts from being inundated with requests for piecemeal review.148 Like subject matter jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction is
regarded by the courts as a necessary condition for the exercise of
their power and if such condition is not satisfied, the appellate
court is deemed “powerless” to proceed.149
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction serves a similar allocative function by distributing decision-making authority among
the various state courts based on their respective connections to
the parties and the claims at issue in a case.150 Current Supreme

145 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1941) (allowing federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where state proceedings could
settle an unresolved issue of state law in a way that would avoid the need to decide a
difficult issue of federal constitutional law); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971)
(prohibiting federal court interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings); Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–20 (1976) (authorizing
abstention to avoid needless duplication of effort with parallel state-court proceedings).
146 See Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031,
1039–40 (2020) (reporting data from 2015 showing that “litigants filed 86.2 million cases
in local [state] courts” compared to “343,176 cases [filed] in federal courts” during that
year).
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2020) (authorizing federal courts of appeals to exercise jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts”); Adam N. Steinman,
Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2007) (“[T]he [ ] final judgment rule [ ] ordinarily postpones any appellate review until the district court reaches a
final judgment.”).
148 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (noting
that the final judgment rule protects against “piecemeal appeals” that would “undermine
the independence of the district judge” and “also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration”).
149 See id. at 379:

[T]he finality requirement embodied in § 1291 is jurisdictional in nature. If the
appellate court finds that the order from which a party seeks to appeal does not
fall within the statute, its inquiry is over. A court lacks discretion to consider
the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.
150 See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 61 (2010) (“[The] constitutional law limiting the scope of personal jurisdiction in state courts in cases involving
domestic actors and events serves an allocational function: it defines which states can and
which states cannot provide a forum to issue binding judgments.” (emphasis in original)).
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Court doctrine allows state courts to exercise “general jurisdiction” over all claims asserted against a defendant who is “essentially at home” in that state151 but limits jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to those claims that are in some way directly
connected to the defendant’s purposefully developed contacts or
connections with the forum state.152 Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is a waivable defense that can be
surrendered or forfeited by party conduct.153 But like subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is regarded as “‘an essential
element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without which
the court is ‘powerless to proceed to an adjudication.’” 154
But not all rules that allocate decision-making authority
among different forums are properly characterized as jurisdictional. Consider, for example, laws governing federal venue,
which limit the permissible forums in which a case may be filed
and provide for moving cases to different courts in specified circumstances.155 Unlike jurisdictional rules, which focus on the adjudicative authority of a particular court, “[v]enue rules generally
reflect equity or expediency in resolving disparate interests of
parties to a lawsuit in the place of trial.”156 As such, venue provisions reflect a classic example of procedural rules. Procedural
rules regulate the manner of adjudicating claims within the
court’s power without purporting to limit or determine the existence of adjudicatory power itself.157 Unlike jurisdiction, which focuses on “separation of authority among institutions,” procedural
rules tend to focus on different values, such as “efficiency, costeffectiveness, autonomy, predictability, and fairness.”158
The similar functional roles that jurisdiction and procedure
play in allocating decision-making authority sometimes leads to
difficult line-drawing problems for courts trying to distinguish the
151 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
152 See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024–25 (2021).
153 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 703–05 (1982).
154 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Emps.
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
155 28 U.S.C. §§ 1390–1413.
156 Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); see also, e.g., Olberding
v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (explaining that the federal venue statute “is
not a qualification upon the power of the court to adjudicate, but a limitation designed for
the convenience of litigants”).
157 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1552 (2008) (“While jurisdictional rules define
whether a court can exercise power to hear and resolve a case, procedural rules dictate
how a court will do so.” (emphasis in original)).
158 In Search of Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 60.
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two.159 But the distinction is nonetheless important. For one
thing, the different functions and purposes of procedural and jurisdictional rules typically correspond to differences in the effects
attributed to such rules. For example, like most other procedural
rules (but unlike subject matter jurisdiction), venue is regarded
as a personal privilege of the litigants that can be waived or forfeited by party conduct.160 Procedural rules are also typically,
though not invariably, applied with a greater degree of flexibility
and discretion than jurisdictional rules.161
More fundamentally, jurisdiction and procedure proceed
from different starting assumptions and rhetorical justifications.
Because procedural rules are generally viewed as mechanisms for
attaining some background purpose or objective—for example, efficiency, accuracy, or fairness—courts are often much more willing to bend, modify, or excuse noncompliance with such rules in
circumstances in which strict compliance would inhibit attainment of those objectives.162 Some such authority over procedure
might be seen as inhering in the very nature of the courts’ judicial
power.163
Jurisdiction is different. Jurisdiction, at least in its idealized
form, can never be made to bend to a court’s “inherent authority”

159 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 623–26 (describing the
Supreme Court’s recent efforts to distinguish jurisdictional rules from other types of legal
rules).
160 See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1939):

The jurisdiction of the federal courts—their power to adjudicate—is a grant of
authority to them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer.
But . . . the place where judicial authority may be exercised—though defined by
legislation relates to the convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their
disposition.
161 See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1988) (noting
that federal courts may excuse “technical[ ]” variance “with the letter of a procedural rule”
but “may not waive [ ] jurisdictional requirements . . . even for ‘good cause shown’ . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Karen Petroski, Statutory Genres; Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction,
44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 215 (2012) (identifying “insusceptibility to judicial modification”
as a “special attribute[ ]” of jurisdictional rules “that nonjurisdictional rules largely lack”).
162 See In Search of Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 60 (“If the procedural rule in question is designed to promote fairness or equitable administration, then it is reasonable to
allow courts to bend or break the procedural rules in certain cases when equity or fairness
demands it.”); cf. Washington v. Ryan, 833 F.3d 1087, 1103 (2016) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
("[Procedural rules] must be respected and enforced, but these rules, after all, are our rules
and we feel a freer hand in the flexible application of those rules.”).
163 Cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (noting that while “the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule,” it
should not be “‘lightly assume[d] that Congress has intended to depart from established
principles,’ such as the scope of a court’s inherent power” (quoting Weinberger v.
Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))).
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because jurisdiction is the court’s authority. Jurisdiction presents
itself as a binary—something that either exists or does not, that
courts either possess or do not.164 The criteria that define a court’s
jurisdiction may give the court discretion regarding whether to
exercise jurisdiction in a particular case or category of cases.165
But a court that determines it lacks jurisdiction has no discretion
to exercise authority over the parties and subject matter of the
lawsuit in the interests of some broader panoply of background
values or principles.166
As various scholars have recognized, this rigid and inflexible
rhetoric of jurisdiction masks a more complex reality.167 Some
rules that seem to limit a court’s jurisdiction might be amenable
to reclassification as nonjurisdictional.168 The language of jurisdiction-limiting provisions and the substance of jurisdictionlimiting doctrines can sometimes be stretched to allow courts to
exercise jurisdiction that seems to be foreclosed (or to decline jurisdiction seemingly reposed in them).169 Lines of demarcation
that are clear in theory are sometimes revealed to be murky and
indeterminate in application.170
But despite such complexities, it seems quite plausible that
jurisdiction’s binary self-presentation facilitates the allocation of
decision-making authority in a way that more overtly procedural
164 See, e.g., Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 492 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Subject
matter jurisdiction . . . is usually thought of in binary terms. It either exists or it does
not.”); May v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 946, 951 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (“Federal
jurisdiction is a binary choice. The switch is either on or off.”).
165 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (authorizing federal courts to decline jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims in certain circumstances).
166 See, e.g., Dane, supra note 19, at 40 (“The law can give judges discretion [over]
whether they will exercise their jurisdiction. . . . But courts cannot have discretion to decide whether they have jurisdiction. Crudely stated, if a court has discretion to decide
whether it has jurisdiction, then, it must have jurisdiction.”).
167 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 8, at 995 (“[J]urisdiction is a pliable legal instrument—
less a rigid legal structure than a court-help ‘bag of tricks.’” (quoting Martha A. Field, The
Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 723 (1981))).
168 See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996) (characterizing the
one-year time limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for removing a case from state court
into federal court as “nonjurisdictional” and thus subject to waiver by party conduct).
169 See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207,
1217 (2001) (contending that “[d]espite the [Supreme] Court’s jurisdiction-first rhetoric, it
has,” in certain cases, chosen to “dispense[ ] federal judicial power based on how important
the Court considers the federal interests at stake, on the merits, and how necessary the
Court considers it to provide a federal remedy where those interests are impaired”).
170 See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (2011) (“[J]urisdictional doctrine is riddled with uncertainty and complexity. Indeed,
virtually every jurisdictional doctrine contains opacity that the Court continues to defend,
despite its simultaneous rhetoric to the contrary.” (citing Field, supra note 167, at 684))
[hereinafter Jurisdictional Clarity].
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rules would not. As Professor Perry Dane observes, “[l]aw is a
world of words” that “depends upon a singular confidence in the
power of words.”171 Maintaining jurisdiction’s identity as both a
source of and limitation on judicial power encourages courts to be
attentive to the limits of their own decision-making authority, as
well as their relationships with other authoritative decision makers. The distinction between jurisdictional rules and other types
of legal rules serves as a reminder that courts derive their authority from sources external to themselves and that their authority
is thus limited by those external sources.172 A judge cannot candidly admit to pressing beyond such limits—no matter how compelling the justification—without undermining the very authority
she claims to be exercising.
B. Allocations Between Different Legal Systems
In addition to allocating authority among different adjudicative institutions within a particular legal system, jurisdiction also
facilitates the allocation of authority between different legal systems. The division of authority between state and federal courts
reflected in federal subject matter jurisdiction and the interstate
division resulting from the limits on state-court personal jurisdiction could plausibly be characterized as reflecting an intersystemic allocation of this sort.173 But a much clearer example is provided by the context of transnational litigation involving forums
or potential forums in two or more different countries.
In the transnational context, jurisdiction’s allocative function
is most clearly visible in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. As
noted above, personal jurisdiction limits the circumstances in
which courts may exercise adjudicative power over nondomicilliaries.174 In cases brought against foreign defendants in U.S.
courts, personal jurisdiction limits judicial authority in much the
same way that the reach of state courts is limited in the domestic

171

Dane, supra note 19, at 3.
See Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, the Legal Imagination;
Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 166 (2008) (“[T]he notion of jurisdictionality suggests that the authority of courts is not grounded merely in their identity
as courts, but in a set of discrete, legally delimited, grants of power, beyond whose bounds
a judge in a robe might almost as well be any common person on the street.”).
173 See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text (discussing federal subject matter jurisdiction); supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text (discussing personal
jurisdiction).
174 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
172
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context.175 U.S. courts may also be called upon to determine the
jurisdictional reach of foreign courts in cases in which they are
asked to recognize or enforce judgments rendered by foreign
courts.176
In the judgment-recognition context, jurisdiction’s perspectival nature is brought to the fore. In discussions of judgment
recognition involving the courts of two or more sovereigns, it is
common to recognize a distinction between “direct jurisdiction”—
i.e., “the jurisdiction a state grants its own courts to render judgments that will be considered valid and enforceable” within the
state—and “indirect jurisdiction”—i.e., the standard a court
should use “to test the jurisdiction of another state whose judgment is presented to it for recognition and enforcement.”177 Courts
of one nation called upon to recognize or enforce judgments rendered by the courts of a different nation are not bound by the
rendering court’s view of its own jurisdiction. Rather, the recognizing court is free to apply its own jurisdictional standard to determine whether the foreign court’s relationship to the parties
and subject matter warrants recognizing its judgment as valid.178
Most U.S. courts, for example, apply the test prescribed by
the U.S. Supreme Court for determining the jurisdictional capacity of state courts to assess the validity foreign judgments.179 But

175 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132–33 (2014); J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877–78 (2011); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2018) (“[T]he conventional approach to the minimum-contacts requirement of personal jurisdiction is that
state [and federal] courts . . . apply the same standard to both alien and domestic defendants.”).
176 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403:

A court in the United States will not recognize a judgment of a court of a foreign
state if . . . the court that rendered the judgment did not have personal jurisdiction over the party resisting recognition or in rem jurisdiction over the res, or
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute.
177 See Harold L. Korn, The Development of Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States,
Part One, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 969 (1999); see also, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 221, 224–25 (1941) (explaining the distinction
between “direct” and “indirect” jurisdiction).
178 See Ralf Michaels, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 11 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed.,
online ed. 2009), https://perma.cc/D665-3HVN (“In the absence of treaty commitments,
countries are under no obligation to recognize and/or enforce foreign judgments.”).
179 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Understanding Judgments Recognition, 40 N.C. INT’L
J.L. & COMM. REG. 877, 889–90 (2015) (noting that “grounds for non-recognition” under
virtually all legal rules applied by U.S. courts “include the rule that a [foreign] judgment
will not be recognized if the court of origin did not have jurisdiction in accordance with
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this standard may sometimes result in a determination that a foreign judgment is invalid and unenforceable in circumstances in
which courts of the country where the judgment was rendered
would regard it as valid.180
The interplay between direct and indirect jurisdictional
standards provides a (not always cooperative) framework through
which legal systems on the international plane allocate decisionmaking authority among themselves.181 Each nation exercises effectively plenary control over how broadly it will view the
jurisdictional reach of its own courts. But this authority is significantly constrained by the reality that, in order to obtain recognition or enforcement of those courts’ judgments in a different
nation, litigants will have to satisfy the test of indirect jurisdiction applied by that other nation’s legal system.
As in the domestic sphere, allocation of decision-making authority on the international plane is facilitated by a variety of
nonjurisdictional mechanisms as well, including procedural rules,
like those governing discovery and joinder of parties,182 as well as
substantive principles, such as the presumption against federal
statutory extraterritoriality.183 But as in the case of domestic allocations, none of these alternative mechanisms carries the same
consequence as do jurisdictional limitations.
U.S. rules of personal jurisdiction”). Not all courts apply such a unitary standard in assessing direct and indirect jurisdiction. Courts in many foreign countries, for example,
accept a broader set of bases for their own exercise of direct jurisdiction than they are
willing to accept in assessing the jurisdictional reach of other countries’ courts. Id. at 891–
92.
180 See, e.g., Kaupthing ehf. v. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund Liquidation Portfolio, 291 F. Supp. 3d 21, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2017) (refusing to recognize a foreign
judgment where the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction under U.S. standards despite the rendering court’s determination that it possessed jurisdiction under its own country’s standards).
181 Efforts to coordinate a broad multilateral framework for transnational judgment
recognition have not been successful. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S.
Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 174–76 (2008) (describing
failure of efforts to negotiate a broad multilateral judgment recognition convention in the
1990s). See generally Linda Silberman & Andreas Lownfeld, A Different Challenge for the
ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American
Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000).
182 See Yanbai Andrea Wang, Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 2089,
2100–09 (2020) (discussing mechanisms through which litigants in foreign proceedings
may access and use discovery ordered by U.S. courts); Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay
Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 93–
95 (2011) (discussing the potential for foreign plaintiffs to bring claims in U.S. courts
through the U.S. class action mechanism).
183 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“It is a
‘longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
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Indeed, the power-based conception of jurisdiction carries
even more significance in the transnational context, where the
bootstrap doctrine has made fewer inroads on the traditional
voidness principle. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, which governs the recognition due to sister-state judgments, has been read
by the Supreme Court to require that state courts’ jurisdictional
determinations be given preclusive effect in subsequent suits.184
But no similar federal standard governs the recognition due foreign court judgments.185 State and federal courts are thus free to
reexamine jurisdictional determinations made by foreign courts
and to regard such judgments as void if they determine that jurisdiction was lacking.186 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the claimed
lack of jurisdiction provides the most common defense to actions
seeking recognition of foreign judgments.187
C. Allocations Across Time
In addition to allocating authority within a particular legal
system and between different legal systems, jurisdictional limitations also serve to allocate decision-making authority across time.
Perhaps the most familiar illustration of this temporal aspect of
jurisdiction’s allocative function is provided by the related doctrines of ripeness and mootness. Along with the closely related
doctrine of standing,188 ripeness and mootness serve as “gatekeeper doctrines” limiting access to the federal courts for particular types of disputes.189 But whereas standing limits who can
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.’” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
184 Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
185 See, e.g., Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1229
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“New York courts have consistently distinguished between judgments of
sister states, which must be accorded full faith and credit as a matter of constitutional
law, and judgments of foreign countries, for which full faith and credit is not constitutionally mandated.”).
186 See, e.g., Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1324–26 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(concluding that a foreign judgment was not entitled to recognition because rendering
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co., 635
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011); Hunt v. BP Expl. Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 898 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction of a foreign court can be reexamined by a recognizing
court.”).
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 cmt. C (“The most common
ground for refusal to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment is lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate in respect of the judgment debtor.”); LINDA SILBERMAN, 1 TRANSNAT’L JOINT
VENTURES § 5:3 (2019) (“Lack of judicial jurisdiction of the rendering court is the most
common defense to recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments.”).
188 See infra notes 202–207 and accompanying text (discussing standing).
189 Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603, 606 (1992).
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invoke the courts’ adjudicative authority, both ripeness and mootness focus much more centrally on the question of when such
authority can be legitimately brought to bear.190 Ripeness bars adjudication of claims that are viewed as having been asserted “too
early”—before a threatened injury is sufficiently imminent or concrete to warrant judicial intervention—while mootness limits
power to adjudicate claims beyond a point the courts view as “too
late”—after the conditions necessary for meaningful judicial redress have passed.191 These doctrines expressly tie the federal
courts’ adjudicative power to the passage of time, resulting in certain cases that courts are unable to adjudicate today, but might
tomorrow, and other cases over which the courts lack power today, despite their possession of such power the day before.192
Other jurisdictional doctrines have less obvious, but nonetheless significant, effects on the allocation of judicial authority
across time. For example, the “minimum contacts” test for personal jurisdiction may sometimes result in a court gaining (or,
more rarely, losing) adjudicative authority to determine the
rights of a particular defendant because of changes in the nature
of the defendant’s connections with the forum state.193 Likewise,
the “time-of-filing rule” for assessing the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction fixes a particular point in time for assessing
jurisdictional sufficiency, allowing courts to ignore subsequent
events that might either create or extinguish jurisdiction.194 The
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which bars courts from
adjudicating claims against foreign sovereigns or their agencies
or instrumentalities, likewise calls for determination of the defendant’s status at the time the lawsuit is filed.195 Jurisdictional
190 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1364 (1973) (describing justiciability doctrines as fundamentally concerned with
determining “who may obtain constitutional declarations and when”).
191 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975) (describing ripeness as focusing
on “whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention”
and mootness as focusing on “whether the occasion for judicial intervention persists”).
192 Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 207 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (identifying mootness and ripeness as among the “many longstanding doctrines under which considerations of justiciability or comity lead courts to abstain from
deciding questions whose initial resolution is better suited to another time”).
193 See generally Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) (discussing how assessments of the contacts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction may be influenced by the passage of time).
194 Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (“It has long
been the case that ‘the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the
time of the action brought.’” (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539
(1824))).
195 See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478–80 (2003).
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time limits deprive courts of adjudicative authority after the nonoccurrence of particular events within a specified period of time.196
Each of these doctrines has the effect of placing adjudicative
authority in a time frame,197 conferring on particular courts jurisdiction that they previously lacked or might otherwise have
lacked—or depriving them of jurisdiction that they previously
possessed or could have possessed—based on the passage of time
and the occurrence or nonoccurrence of particular events. The
equation of jurisdiction with a court’s power or basic authority
facilitates this temporal allocation by preserving unimpaired the
legal status of claims asserted at the wrong time. Unlike statutes
of limitations—and other rules that extinguish or bar remediation for claims after a specified period198—application of a jurisdictional rule “usually ‘takes away no substantive right but
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’”199 Even
when no other forum is available to remediate a claim that is jurisdictionally barred,200 the focus of jurisdictional rules on adjudicative power rather than the status of the underlying right leaves
open the way to potential reassertion of the claim if it is later
brought within the scope of a particular court’s legitimately conferred jurisdiction.201
D. Allocations Between Adjudicative and Nonadjudicative
Institutions
A further allocative function of jurisdiction involves the allocation of decision-making authority between courts and other
types of decision-making institutions, such as legislatures and
executive authorities. The Supreme Court has emphasized this

196

See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2007).
Cf. Monaghan, supra note 190, at 1384 (describing mootness as “the doctrine of
standing set in a time frame.”).
198 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith 496 U.S. 167, 221 (1990) (“Statutes of
limitations proceed upon the ‘presumption that claims are extinguished whenever they
are not litigated in the proper forum within the prescribed period.’” (quoting Hanger v.
Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 538 (1868))).
199 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Hallowell v.
Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
200 Cf. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 292–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that a jurisdictional rule may sometimes “deny a litigant a forum for his claim entirely . . . or may leave
him with an alternate forum that will deny relief for some collateral reason (e.g., a statute
of limitations bar)”).
201 Cf. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 703 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that jurisdiction-conferring rules can sometimes have the effect of “creating a forum where none existed” before (emphasis omitted)).
197
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particular form of allocation as central to the constitutional limitation of Article III courts to adjudicating actual “Cases” and
“Controversies.”202 The Court has described this case-orcontroversy requirement, along with “[t]he several doctrines that
have grown up to elaborate that requirement,” as being “‘founded
in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the
courts in a democratic society.”203
Among the most significant jurisdictional doctrines through
which this case-or-controversy requirement is implemented is the
doctrine of standing, which aims to assess “whether [a] plaintiff
has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction
and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”204 By insisting that plaintiffs demonstrate an actual,
concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged
conduct and redressable by the court,205 the standing doctrine
aims to “limit the federal judicial power ‘to those disputes which
confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of
resolution through the judicial process.’” 206 A corollary of this limitation is that some disputes may be deemed insusceptible to resolution by the federal courts, leaving their resolution to other decision makers, such as the president or Congress.207
Other jurisdictional doctrines reflect a similar allocation of
decision-making authority to institutions other than courts. The
political-question doctrine, for example, has sometimes been explained as a mechanism for preventing courts from interfering
with questions properly “entrusted to one of the political
202 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“[T]he ‘case
or controversy’ requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.”).
203 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
204 Warth 422 U.S. at 498–99 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
205 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
206 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
207 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“[T]he absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that
the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
political process.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992):

To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the
courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”
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branches” of government.208 The sovereign immunity of the
federal and state governments has the effect of ensuring that institutions other than courts make certain types of decisions regarding governmental conduct and the allocation of scarce public
resources.209 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity preserves a similar realm of decision-making authority for foreign
governments while also channeling complaints based on the conduct of foreign governments toward the diplomatic process rather
than toward the courts.210
As with the other types of allocation discussed in this Section,
jurisdictional rules are not the only types of rules that affect the
balance of authority between courts and other types of institutions.211 But once again, the power-centered conception of jurisdiction facilitates certain types of allocations that would not be possible using other types of rules. Unlike substantive and
procedural rules that limit or extinguish a litigant’s legal entitlements, jurisdictional rules merely limit the availability of a particular forum or a particular group of forums, leaving the parties’
underlying substantive entitlements unaffected.212 Jurisdictional
constraints may thus limit the courts’ adjudicatory authority over
substantive entitlements that the political branches lack the
power to alter directly, such as entitlements grounded in the U.S.
Constitution.213 But such restrictions do not alter the substantive
208 See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (quoting Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
209 See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869) (“The principle
[of sovereign immunity] is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and but for the
protection which it affords, the government would be unable to perform the various duties
for which it was created.”); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
concern “that federal court judgments not deplete state treasuries” was among the principal motivations for the adoption of Eleventh Amendment immunity for states).
210 See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) (noting that the practice
of granting foreign sovereigns immunity from suit “is founded upon the policy . . . that the
national interests will be best served when controversies . . . are adjusted through diplomatic channels rather than by the compulsion of judicial proceedings”).
211 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 647 (mentioning “issues of
statutory coverage, statutes of limitations, and the like” as examples of rules that similarly
“restrict court relief but leave open the possibility of statutory reform by Congress”).
212 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (observing that
the “[a]pplication of a new jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away no substantive right but
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case’” (quoting Hallowell, 239 U.S. at 508
(1916))).
213 The scope and limits of Congress’s authority to selectively limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts with respect to particular types of constitutional claims is the subject of
a longstanding debate in scholarship on federal courts. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN
F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 307–25 (7th ed. 2015) (describing various
aspects of and positions asserted in this debate).
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legal obligations applicable to the political branches of government. Even in the absence of judicial review, the president, members of Congress, and other public officials remain bound by their
oaths of office to comply with the Constitution and all laws duly
enacted under it.214 Decisions by elected officials regarding the
proper actions to take in the absence of judicial reviewability thus
reflect not only considerations of policy or political expediency but
also—at least as a formal matter215—decisions regarding legality.216 Rules restricting the availability of a judicial forum to the
review of such determinations by nonjudicial decision makers effectively allow those decision makers, rather than the courts, to
have the last word on the question of legality.
IV. JURISDICTION’S EFFECTS
Understanding jurisdiction’s identity as the power or basic
authority of a court and its role in allocating decision-making authority among different actors and institutions allows for a
clearer understanding of jurisdiction’s effects. The association of
jurisdiction with power is sometimes assumed to lead directly and
perhaps even “inexorably” to a set of “unique and immutable effects.”217 Among other things, characterizing a rule as “jurisdictional” typically leads to the following assumptions: (1) that the
rule cannot be waived or forfeited by the parties; (2) that it must

214 See generally Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. L. REV. 299
(2016) (discussing the link between constitutional oath taking and officials’ obligations to
comply with the law).
215 The extent to which legal norms constrain officials in the political branches in the
absence of formal sanctions is a subject of academic debate. Skeptical views of the constraining effect of law are reflected in, for example, the works of Professors Eric Posner,
Adrian Vermeule, and Frederick Schauer. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 4 (2011) (“[T]he major constraints on the executive . . . do not
arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework . . . but from politics and public
opinion.”); Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 797–801 (2010) (suggesting that public officials may have little
incentive or inclination to obey the law just because it is the law). Professor Julian Davis
Mortenson provides a more optimistic perspective. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Law
Matters, Even to the Executive, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1015, 1033 (2015) (contending that “influential actors across the political spectrum take law seriously and have done so even in
the teeth of serious threats to the national security” (reviewing JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER
AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) and POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 215).
216 Cf. Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 647 (arguing that standing and
other doctrines that limit judicial review of decisions by the political branches should not
be seen as “jurisdictional” because, inter alia, “Congress and the Executive consider policies and political expediencies, not (usually) unconstitutionality or legality”).
217 Id. at 623.
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be rigidly and inflexibly applied without regard to equitable considerations; (3) that noncompliance may be contested by any
party at any time prior to judgment and must be considered by
the court sua sponte if no challenge is raised; and (4) that any
dismissal for noncompliance with the rule must be without prejudice, preserving the legal status of the underlying claim.218
But a closer focus on what it means to speak of jurisdiction
as a court’s power reveals that several of these associated effects
are not, in fact, essential features of jurisdiction but rather incidental features that have come to be associated with particular
jurisdictional rules. Nothing about the essential definition of jurisdiction as power demands that any given jurisdictional rule be
regarded as nonwaivable, nonforfeitable, insusceptible to equitable or discretionary modification, or obligatory on courts to raise
on their own initiative. These features all reflect things that jurisdictional rules could be and often are, but that they are not
necessarily.
By contrast, the inability of courts to conclusively determine
the parties’ rights and responsibilities by entering a binding judgment is a necessary, and not merely incidental, feature of jurisdiction’s identity. A court that has the capacity to enter a binding
judgment possesses the kind of authority that is the hallmark of
jurisdiction as it is classically understood. Attempting to decouple
this particular effect from jurisdictional rules is to transform jurisdiction into something else, something that jurisdiction necessarily is not.
A. What Jurisdiction Is Not Necessarily
1. Nonwaivable and nonforfeitable.
Perhaps the easiest way to start distinguishing the necessary
effects of jurisdiction from the merely incidental effects is by focusing on issues of waivability and forfeitability.219 These effects
are particularly susceptible to decoupling from jurisdiction’s identity because they do not actually characterize multiple existing
doctrines that are widely recognized as “jurisdictional” in nature.

218 See Preis, supra note 24, at 1420–21 (listing jurisdiction’s presumed effects); see
also Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 623 (providing a similar list).
219 Although sometimes used interchangeably, “waiver” and “forfeiture” refer to different concepts; forfeiture refers to “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,”
while waiver refers to “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017) (alterations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
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Personal jurisdiction, for example, is clearly “jurisdictional”
and its absence, according to conventional accounts, renders the
courts “powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”220 But personal
jurisdiction is, and has always been, regarded as a personal privilege that can be waived, consented to, or forfeited by the parties.221 Sovereign immunity is likewise regarded as a jurisdictional barrier.222 But as with personal jurisdiction, a sovereign is
free to waive the protection sovereign immunity provides, thereby
rendering itself amenable to a court’s jurisdiction.223
The waivable nature of both personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity poses obvious challenges for those who would define jurisdiction by reference to the list of traditionally associated
effects discussed above.224 One possible response might be to recategorize these doctrines as nonjurisdictional in order to preserve jurisdiction’s conceptual identity.225 But such a project
would run counter to centuries of tradition and practice.
A more modest response might be to accept the jurisdictional
nature of both personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity but
insist that there is something special about subject matter jurisdiction that requires it to remain nonwaivable. The Supreme
Court has suggested an argument along these lines as a basis for
distinguishing personal jurisdiction from subject matter jurisdiction, suggesting that the latter doctrine’s nonwaivability derives

220 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Emps.
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
221 See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694,
703 (1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”); Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 421, 428–29 (1808) (“By appearing to the action, the defendants in the court
below placed themselves precisely in the situation in which they would have stood, had
process been served upon them, and consequently waived all objections to the non-service
of process.”).
222 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”).
223 See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (noting that
sovereign immunity is waivable); see also, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys.
of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that the state waived sovereign immunity when
it removed a case to federal court); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (holding that a state waives immunity when it sues in federal court).
224 Cf. Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 629–31 (discussing deficiencies
of effect-based definitions).
225 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18–28 (2008) (arguing that state sovereign immunity could be reconceptualized as a nonjurisdictional doctrine); Aaron R. Petty, Personal Jurisdiction as a Mandatory Rule, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 1,
1 (2013) (arguing that “personal jurisdiction is not ‘jurisdiction’ at all”).
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from its connection to “sovereignty.”226 But this sovereignty-based
rationale obviously fails as a basis for distinguishing sovereign
immunity, which—like subject matter jurisdiction—functions as
a structural limitation on the sovereign power of the courts.
Nor is it clear why waivers or consent by private parties
should be thought categorically incapable of affecting structural
judicial powers. For example, current law makes private consent
relevant to determining whether certain non–Article III officials,
such as federal magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges, may
exercise jurisdiction over certain types of claims.227 More generally, the scope of federal judicial authority over private claims
routinely depends on a variety of purely private litigation decisions regarding, among other things, which claims to assert,
which parties to name, which court to file in, and whether to remove a case to federal court.228
Of course, subject matter jurisdiction in the U.S. legal system
typically is regarded as nonwaivable and nonforfeitable. And
nonwaivability is a sufficiently common feature of jurisdictional
rules to make the proposition that “jurisdiction cannot be waived”
a plausible description of legal doctrine in much the same way
that “birds fly” is a plausible description of the natural world.229
But in making such statements, it is important to keep in mind
the distinction between commonly associated features and features that are necessary and sufficient to define the underlying
concept. Just as there are some birds that do not fly (e.g., emus
and penguins) and some flying animals that are not birds (e.g.,
bats and bees), the existence of waivable jurisdictional rules (and
226 See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702 (“[T]he personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”); see also id.
at 702 n.10 (explaining that if personal jurisdiction “operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal
jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise
be protected.”).
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (authorizing magistrate judges to “order the entry of judgment” in civil cases where the parties consent); 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (empowering bankruptcy courts to adjudicate certain categories of cases “with the consent of all the parties
to the proceeding”); see also, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 669–
71 (2015).
228 See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 8 n.29 (2014) (“Party choices of whom to sue, what claims to assert, the amount of
relief to claim, and what court to file in (or remove to), all can establish or defeat subjectmatter jurisdiction.”).
229 See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813,
1838 (2012) (“A sentence like ‘birds fly’ isn’t universally true. . . . But [it] is still perfectly
acceptable shorthand for describing the world, in a way that ‘walruses fly’ is not.”).
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nonwaivable rules that are not jurisdictional)230 demonstrates
that nonwaivability cannot be regarded as a defining feature of
“jurisdiction” as a legal concept.231
2. Inflexible and insusceptible to equitable accommodation.
In addition to being generally considered nonwaivable and
nonforfeitable, jurisdictional rules are also usually assumed to be
rigid, inflexible, and insusceptible to judicial modification or equitable accommodation.232 On this understanding, it is in the nature of jurisdictional rules to be applied “rigidly, literally, and
mercilessly,” and a court can brook no exception to such harsh
treatment without overstepping its lawfully conferred power.233
At least part of the intuition driving this rigid and inflexible
conception of jurisdiction’s identity has already been sketched
above. As noted earlier, if jurisdiction is identified with the court’s
legal power over the parties and subject matter, it can never be a
matter of pure judicial discretion or grace to decide whether such
power exists.234 But it hardly follows that the legal standards that
define a court’s jurisdiction can never allow considerations of equity, undue hardship, or the like to play a role in defining the
parameters of that jurisdiction. For example, although the
Supreme Court has held that the thirty-day deadline for taking
an appeal from a final judgment of a district court is jurisdictional,235 the statute that provides for that deadline expressly
allows for its extension by the district court “upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause.”236

230 See, e.g., Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12 (2004) (noting that nonjurisdictional time limits applicable to bankruptcy proceedings may not be modifiable by the consent of a debtor and creditor when the modification might prejudice other creditors); cf.
United States v. Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190, 193 (C.M.A. 1983) (holding that an unlawfulcommand-influence defense in court martial proceedings is nonjurisdictional but also
nonwaivable).
231 See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1305 (2017)
(“Whether an issue is waivable depends on the particular legal standard involved, not on
the abstract category to which it belongs.”).
232 See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“[T]his Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”).
233 See Dane, supra note 19, at 5 (“[I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, courts will interpret and apply it rigidly, literally, and mercilessly.”); see also, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214.
234 See supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text; see also Dane, supra note 19, at
10 (“[C]ourts cannot simply excuse [jurisdictional time limits] as a matter of judicial discretion, if discretion is understood as akin to an act of grace.”).
235 Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213–14.
236 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see also Scott Dodson, Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply
to Critics, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 225, 230 (2008) (observing that “Congress might
make a rule jurisdictional yet also intend it to be subject to some flexibility in application”).
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Nor is it obvious that less textually explicit statutory directives need to be interpreted in an unflinchingly merciless manner.
Most theories of statutory interpretation—textualism included—
allow for statutory language to carry nonliteral meanings.237
Thus, even seemingly clear statutory limits on jurisdiction might
be read in light of their surrounding legal context to confer on
courts the discretion to take the equities of a particular case into
account in determining whether the jurisdictional prerequisites
have been satisfied.238
Of course, the fact that jurisdictional rules can be interpreted
and applied flexibly does not necessarily suggest that such flexible application is desirable. Rigid and unflinching application of
a jurisdictional rule might have important benefits, such as incentivizing compliance, promoting finality, easing administrability, protecting reasonable reliance interests, and ensuring the
equal treatment of similarly situated litigants.239 It should thus
come as no surprise that many jurisdictional rules are, in fact,
interpreted and applied in a strict and inflexible manner. The important point is that the inflexibility of jurisdictional rules results
from the content of the rules themselves, when read in light of
applicable background legal rules and interpretive principles, rather than from anything inhering in the concept of jurisdiction
as such.
3. Mandatory and subject to judicial self-policing.
A further cluster of effects typically associated with jurisdiction relates specifically to the obligations of courts. The Supreme
Court, for example, has insisted that federal courts must police
their own jurisdiction and raise and resolve jurisdictional questions sua sponte, regardless of the stage of proceedings and even
if no jurisdictional objection has been raised by any party to the

237 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis:
Redux, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 855, 856–57 (2020) (contesting the view that textualism
requires literalism); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108 (2001) (“Modern textualists [ ] are not literalists.”).
238 See, e.g., Hybridizing Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 1459–61; Dane, supra note 19,
at 63–65.
239 Hybridizing Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 1449–50 (discussing potential benefits
of inflexibility); E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The Worst
Kind of Deadline—Except for All Others, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151, 152 (2008)
(contending that ignoring unambiguous jurisdictional time limits “in the name of ‘flexibility’ or ‘equity’ . . . causes uncertainty and confusion as to when a judgment is final, invites
wasted resources in sorting out whether exceptions apply, and undermines the reliability
and evenhandedness that are essential for a system of justice”).
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litigation.240 The Court has characterized this obligation as
“springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the
United States.”241
The presumed obligation of courts to confirm the existence of
their own jurisdiction cuts somewhat closer to jurisdiction’s conceptual core than some of the other effects mentioned above. As
will be discussed in further detail below, any putative exercise of
jurisdiction by a court reflects at least an implicit representation
by the court that such jurisdiction actually exists.242 But it does
not necessarily follow that courts must police their own jurisdictional boundaries in the particular manner reflected in the
Supreme Court’s current doctrine concerning subject matter
jurisdiction.
For example, because jurisdictional objections need not be regarded as nonforfeitable,243 a party’s failure to raise a particular
jurisdictional objection at a particular stage of a litigation might
be regarded as grounds for deeming the objection forfeited. A
party who has affirmatively invoked a particular court’s jurisdiction or made representations supporting the existence of such jurisdiction might likewise be barred by principles of estoppel from
later seeking to contest such jurisdiction.244 Indeed, both forfeiture and estoppel are already recognized by the Supreme Court
as permissible bases for establishing a court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.245 And though the Court has viewed state
sovereign immunity as somewhat less vulnerable to forfeiture

240 See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubjectmatter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884):

[T]he rule . . . is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of
its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate
power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on which, in the exercise
of that power, it is called to act.
241

Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382.
See infra notes 274–276 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 219–228 and accompanying text.
244 Cf. DiFrischia v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960) (holding that a
party was estopped from denying previously admitted allegations of diverse citizenship).
But see Mennen Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 287, 294 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that DiFrischia’s holding had been repudiated by subsequent Supreme Court precedent).
245 See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704 (“[T]he requirement of personal jurisdiction
may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from
raising the issue.”).
242
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than personal jurisdiction,246 the Court has signaled that the sovereign immunity of state governments is not the type of jurisdictional issue that need be raised and addressed by the courts sua
sponte.247
Alternatively, a particular legal system might allow courts to
presume the validity of a plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations absent sufficiently clear proof to the contrary. Such a presumption
is contrary to current Supreme Court doctrine, which requires jurisdiction to be affirmatively demonstrated by the proponent.248
But it is consistent with the practices of many state courts, which
place the burden of disproving jurisdiction on the party contesting
its existence.249 Such an approach may also find some support in
the early practices of federal courts, which were much more dependent on pleadings to determine whether the factual requisites
of jurisdiction were satisfied.250
B. What Jurisdiction Necessarily is Not
For reasons discussed in the preceding Section, I agree with
those scholars who have argued that jurisdictional rules are susceptible to a broader and more varied range of effects than is typically assumed.251 But it does not follow that the effects properly
attributable to jurisdiction are infinitely malleable. For the term
“jurisdiction” to function as a useful legal concept, it must carry
246 Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that “the Eleventh
Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it
need not be raised in the trial court” and can be raised for the first time on appeal), with
Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 705 (observing that “the failure to enter a timely objection to
personal jurisdiction” in a responsive pleading “constitutes . . . a waiver of the objection”).
247 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982) (“[W]e have never
held that [Eleventh Amendment defenses] . . . must be raised and decided by this Court
on its own motion.”).
248 See supra note 143.
249 See, e.g., Lavallie v. Jay, 945 N.W. 2d 288, 291 (2020) (“State courts of general
jurisdiction enjoy a presumption of jurisdiction, and the party challenging subject matter
jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the court lacks jurisdiction.”); GKN Co. v.
Magness, 744 N.E. 2d 397, 404 (Ind. 2001) (“As a general proposition, the party challenging subject matter jurisdiction carries the burden of establishing that jurisdiction does not
exist.”).
250 See Collins, supra note 68, at 1831–32 (contending that “in the early Republic,
there was heavy, and sometimes exclusive, reliance on the parties’ pleadings to settle jurisdictional questions in the federal courts, even when jurisdiction might be lacking ‘in
fact’”).
251 See, e.g., Jurisdiction and Its Effects, supra note 15, at 630 (arguing that “jurisdictional rules can have fewer, even none, of the effects commonly associated with jurisdiction”); Preis, supra note 24, at 1430 (arguing that Congress can “make jurisdictional laws
subject to waiver or forfeiture, not subject to sua sponte inquiry, or impose any other effect
commonly attached to jurisdictional laws”).
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at least some intrinsic linguistic and legal content. If jurisdiction
is understood as the power of a court to conclusively determine
the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties who appear
before it, then the existence of “jurisdiction” would seem to be a
necessary precondition for the court’s ability to enter a final judgment that will conclusively bind the parties. By contrast, a rule
or condition that does not affect the court’s ability to enter such a
binding judgment would not properly be regarded as “jurisdictional” in nature.
This somewhat simplified picture of jurisdiction’s necessary
effects is rendered more complex by the various intricacies of preclusion doctrine. As already discussed, the doctrine of
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction—which reflects a distinctive branch of preclusion law252—sometimes allows later courts to
behave as if a judgment rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction was, in fact, valid when issued.253 Further complexities result
from the distinction in preclusion law between claim preclusion
and issue preclusion—or, to use a slightly more antiquated and
imprecise terminology, res judicata and collateral estoppel.254
Claim preclusion describes the set of principles that allow
and require courts to “treat[ ] a judgment, once rendered, as the
full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on
the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’” 255 Claim preclusion has two
principal components: (1) “merger,” which cuts off a successful litigant’s ability to reassert the same claim or cause of action in a
later proceeding, thereby limiting any potential relief to that reflected in the judgment itself, and (2) “bar,” which prohibits an
unsuccessful litigant from relitigating the same claim or cause of
action in a subsequent proceeding.256
Issue preclusion, on the other hand, “recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits
on other claims” and “bars the relitigation of issues actually adju-

252

See Clermont, supra note 19, at 318.
See supra Parts II.A & II.B (discussing the doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determinejurisdiction and its relationship to the power-based conception of jurisdiction).
254 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (rev. ed. 2002) (describing the “varying and occasionally
conflicting terminology” surrounding preclusion doctrine and efforts to clarify the terminology through the embrace of “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion”).
255 Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir.
1978).
256 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17–19 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
253
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dicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties.”257 Unlike claim preclusion, which only
applies in subsequent actions involving the same underlying
claims or causes of action, issue preclusion bars relitigation of any
issues that were actually litigated and necessary to the disposition of a prior adjudication.258
A finding of jurisdiction—either explicit or implicit—is generally viewed as essential for claim preclusion, and a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction thus carries no claim-preclusive effect.259
Issue preclusion, by contrast, can bar relitigation of at least some
issues determined by a court that acknowledges its lack of jurisdiction—including issues that were necessarily decided by the
court in the course of determining that jurisdiction was lacking.260
This difference in the respective significance of jurisdiction
for claim preclusion and issue preclusion makes sense in view of
the two doctrines’ different historical and conceptual foundations.
Claim preclusion traces its origins to Roman antecedents, which
emphasized both the public and private interests in litigation finality as well as “the theoretical conception of a judicial decision
as absorbing, when pronounced, that which had till then been a
mere cause of action.”261 The influence of this tradition is still visible in the doctrine’s modern contours—particularly, the connected features of merger and bar, which collectively extinguish
257

Kaspar Wire Works, 575 F.2d at 535–36.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
259 See, e.g., Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A suit
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cannot also be dismissed ‘with prejudice’; that’s a disposition on the merits, which only a court with jurisdiction may render.”); NextWave Pers.
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction [ ] are not decisions on the merits and therefore have no claim preclusive effect on
subsequent attempts to bring suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.” (quotation marks
and alterations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(a) (“A personal
judgment for the defendant, although valid and final, does not bar another action by the
plaintiff on the same claim [ ] [w]hen the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . .”).
260 See, e.g., Matosantos Com. Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“Although a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a
matter of claim preclusion, it does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling
on the jurisdiction question.” (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436 (1981))); Goldsmith v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 987 F.2d 1064, 1069 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[A] jurisdictional
dismissal that does not constitute a judgment on the merits so as to completely bar further
transactionally-related claims still operates to bar relitigation of issues actually decided
by that former judgment.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. C (1982)
(“When the question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction is raised in the original action . . . there
is no reason why the determination of the issue should not thereafter be conclusive under
the usual rules of issue preclusion.”).
261 1 GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 219 (1924).
258
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the parties’ preexisting legal rights with respect to the asserted
claims and replace them with a new set of entitlements grounded
in the judgment itself.262
Issue preclusion, by contrast, originally grew out of AngloGermanic ideas connected to principles of estoppel.263 Like other
estoppel doctrines, issue preclusion reflects the view that a
party’s own conduct can serve as a permissible basis for limiting
the positions he or she can later assert in litigation.264 The core
idea underlying issue preclusion is that it is both prudent and fair
to prohibit a party who has received a full and fair opportunity to
litigate a particular issue from relitigating that same issue in
later proceedings.265 Whereas claim preclusion focuses centrally
on the effect of a court’s judgment in transforming or extinguishing preexisting rights, issue preclusion is more concerned with
the record established by the proceedings leading up to that judgment.266
In its earliest iterations, issue preclusion was wholly disconnected from the final judgment, allowing preclusion to attach to
any issues resolved by the court, even if no final judgment was
262 See, e.g., Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 584 (1945) (“Judgments take the place
of the cause of action, and are the only admissible criterion of its existence, scope and
effect.”); Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 367 (1914) (“[A] cause of action, when reduced
to a judgment, has ceased to exist as an independent liability, and has changed its nature
and is transmuted into the obligation created by the judgment, which is different in kind
and essential characteristics from the initial cause of action.”); Biddleson v. Whitel (1764),
1 Blackstone W. 506, 507 (K.B.) (describing the parties’ preexisting rights connected to the
cause of action as having been “drowned in the judgment”).
263 On the historical foundations of issue preclusion and its relationship to claim preclusion, see, for example, Alexandra Bursak, Note, Preclusions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1651,
1660–69 (2016); Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to
Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 41–56 (1940).
264 See, e.g., 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 667, at 352a (London, J. & W.T. Clarke,
19th ed. 1832) (1628) (explaining that the concept of estoppel “commeth of the French word
estoupe, from whence the English word stopped: and it is called an estoppel or conclusion,
because a man’s owne act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to alleage or
plead the truth . . . .”).
265 See Austin Wakeman Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1,
3 (1940) (explaining that the “estoppel” underlying issue preclusion “does not rise from
representations made by one of the parties upon which the other party has relied” but
rather reflects the view that “a party who has once fought out a question in litigation with
the other party” should be “precluded from fighting it out again”); see also Kilheffer v.
Herr, 17 Serg. & Rawle 319, 320 (Pa. 1828) (“[A]s the defendant had an opportunity of
showing the truth of the fact, he shall not afterwards be permitted to contradict a record
to which he is a party. He is estopped to deny that which has been solemnly ruled against
him.”).
266 See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877) (“It is not the recovery,
but the matter alleged by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds, which creates
the estoppel.” (quoting Outram v. Morewood (1803), 3 East 346, 355 (K.B.))).
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ultimately issued.267 Even after the doctrine evolved to limit preclusion to issues that were necessary to the court’s final judgment, the judgment’s role was limited to “perfecting, confirming
and authenticating the record of the antecedent episode of the
proceeding which constituted the estoppel.”268 Vestiges of this
somewhat attenuated relationship between issue preclusion and
judgment can still be glimpsed in modern case law allowing at
least some determinations reached prior to a final judgment to be
regarded as sufficiently “final” to warrant issue preclusive effect.269
This clearer picture of jurisdiction’s relationship to preclusion doctrine allows for a more accurate description of jurisdiction’s necessary effects. At a minimum, a finding of jurisdiction
seems to be a necessary precondition for a court’s ability to issue
the type of judgment that should be entitled to claim-preclusive
effect—sometimes referred to as a judgment “on the merits.”270
Claim preclusion defines a judgment’s capacity to make new law
for the parties—to directly transform or extinguish the parties’
legal rights and responsibilities with respect to the claims asserted in a litigation. Claim preclusion is thus intimately connected to the type of authority that is central to the conception of
jurisdiction as power described above in Part I.271
Issue preclusion, by contrast, is much more tenuously connected to a judgment’s lawmaking capacity. To the contrary, the
doctrine of issue preclusion sometimes dispenses with the requirement of a valid final judgment entirely.272 Nor does issue preclusion purport to directly transform, extinguish, or modify any
preexisting rights. Rather, it merely limits the types of evidence

267
268
269

Bursak, supra note 263, at 1664–65.
Millar, supra note 263, at 55.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13:

The rules of res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment is rendered.
However, for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger and
bar), ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.
See also, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 87–90 (2d
Cir. 1961).
270 See infra note 348 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of “on the merits” in the preclusion context).
271 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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and arguments that the parties may use to establish their rights
in subsequent litigation.273
From these premises, a few conclusions follow. First, a rule
or restriction that purports to limit judicial decision-making but
does not restrict the court’s ability to enter a claim-preclusive
judgment is not properly regarded as “jurisdictional” in nature.
Such rules may be obligatory on the court—as is true of myriad
rules of substantive and procedural law—but they do not deprive
the court of the core judgment-rendering power that is central to
the classical conception of jurisdiction as power.
Second, a judge who seeks to stay within the limits of the
court’s prescribed jurisdiction must determine that jurisdiction
actually exists before proceeding to enter a judgment that he or
she expects will carry claim-preclusive effects in subsequent litigation. Even if a merits-based dismissal allows for a decision that
is more expeditious and efficient, more obviously correct, or less
controversial,274 the court cannot avoid answering the jurisdictional question, at least implicitly. To the extent that a judge reasonably believes that a particular ruling will or should carry
claim-preclusive effect, a decision to issue that ruling unavoidably
reflects a decision to exercise jurisdiction. A judicial opinion that
purports to “avoid” addressing a jurisdictional issue on such
grounds and proceeds to a merits determination (a practice once
common in the lower federal courts)275 might avoid a burdensome,
uncomfortable, or potentially erroneous explanation of the court’s
decision to exercise jurisdiction. But it would not change the fact
that the court has, in fact, exercised the power to conclusively
bind the parties to its determinations—i.e., that it has exercised
jurisdiction.276
273 See, e.g., Drennen v. Wren, 416 S.W.2d 229, 235–36 (Mo. 1967) (finding that, where
a second suit involves a different cause of action, “the judgment in the first suit does not
extinguish the second cause of action by either merger or bar, but may be effective, through
collateral estoppel, to conclude the parties as to facts and matters actually contested and
litigated in the first action”).
274 Cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 305–14 (1999) (summarizing various rationales offered by
federal circuit courts for choosing to address merits issues before jurisdictional questions).
275 See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
276 As then-Judge Clarence Thomas observed in criticizing a decision reflecting a similar attempt to avoid reaching a jurisdictional question:

The truistic constraint on the federal judicial power [ ] . . . is this: A federal court
may not decide cases when it cannot decide cases, and must determine whether
it can, before it may. The majority here changes this fundamental precept to
read, in effect, that under certain circumstances a federal court should decide
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Finally, a court faced with the question of whether to give
claim-preclusive effect to a prior adjudication must conclude that
the rendering court possessed jurisdiction as a necessary step to
recognizing the earlier judgment. Such recognition need not require investigation into the factual basis for the rendering court’s
jurisdiction. A later court might instead rely upon a presumption
of the type relied upon by English and early U.S. courts with regard to the rulings of courts of general jurisdiction.277 Or a finding
of jurisdiction might be premised instead on a lawfully authorized
“as if” exception of the type reflected in the bootstrap principle.278
But if jurisdiction is equated with a court’s power or basic authority, then such a conclusion regarding the rendering court’s authority is unavoidable. Whether acknowledged or not, according
claim-preclusive effect to an earlier court’s judgment necessarily
acknowledges the earlier court’s legal authority—i.e., its “jurisdiction”—to conclusively validate, alter, or extinguish the legal
rights at issue in the earlier case and to bind the parties to its
judgment.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A clearer understanding of jurisdiction’s connection to judicial power can help to inform and clarify multiple strands of judicial doctrine as well as broader theoretical debates regarding the
judiciary’s role in the constitutional framework. This Part focuses
on three such potential implications of jurisdiction-as-power for
current jurisprudential and constitutional debates. First, reinforcing jurisdiction’s identity as adjudicatory power can help to
clarify the dividing line separating “jurisdictional” rules from
other types of rules and help to eliminate some of the confusion
that has crept into judicial doctrine addressing this distinction.
Second, understanding the relationship between jurisdiction and
power points to a clearer framework for sequencing jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional issues for resolution by the federal courts.
Finally, a clearer understanding of jurisdiction’s relationship to
judicial power can also help to clarify the binding force of judicial
judgments on executive branch officials.

cases regardless of whether it can, and need not determine whether it can, before
it does.
Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review).
277 See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.
278 See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
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A. Classification and Effects
As discussed above, jurisdictional rules are not the only types
of rules that constrain courts. Other rules, including rules of procedural and substantive law, also bind the courts without
purporting to limit or narrow the scope of their jurisdiction. Distinguishing jurisdictional rules and limitations from such nonjurisdictional rules has proven a persistent challenge for courts and
commentators. After decades of somewhat incautious use of the
“jurisdictional” label, the Supreme Court has endeavored in recent years to clarify the line between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” provisions.279 The Court has adopted a “clear
statement rule” demanding that “courts . . . treat [a] restriction
as nonjurisdictional in character” unless Congress has clearly
manifested a contrary intent.280 But while the Court’s new approach has eliminated some of the needless confusion spurred by
unthinking “drive-by” jurisdictional characterizations,281 it has
not succeeded in clearly demarcating the boundary between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules.282
To some extent, the persistence of uncertainty surrounding
jurisdictional classification may be unavoidable. Jurisdictional
policies reflect a diverse range of sometimes competing values
that are challenging to reconcile with one another.283 And such
values may sometimes overlap in substantial measure with the
values furthered by other types of legal rules, including rules of
substantive and procedural law.284 But despite such challenges,
there is reason to believe that a closer focus on jurisdiction’s con-

279 See Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the
Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2027, 2033–48 (2015). See generally
Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 947 (2011).
280 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006); see also, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn
Regional Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153–54 (2013); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141–
42 (2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435–36 (2011).
281 See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (“Our recent
cases evince a marked desire to curtail such ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings,’ which too
easily can miss the critical difference[s] between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004))).
282 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Critique of Jurisdictionality, 39 REV. LITIG. 355, 360
(2020) (“Though the Court has declared its framework to be clear and simple, the framework has generated a number of complications and oddities that the Court has tended to
ignore or gloss over.”).
283 Jurisdictional Clarity, supra note 170, at 24–26.
284 See supra notes 157–170 and accompanying text (discussing the overlap between
jurisdiction and procedure).
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nection to adjudicative authority might go some way toward clarifying the boundary that separates jurisdictional provisions from
other types of provisions. Although the Supreme Court has gestured toward this idea in certain recent opinions,285 the Court has
too often dispensed with the inquiry into adjudicative authority
by viewing jurisdiction as merely a “convenient shorthand” for a
defined set of effects.286
Consider the Court’s 2006 decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp.,287 the case in which the Court first articulated its clearstatement rule for jurisdictional characterization.288 Arbaugh involved a claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,289 which prohibits various forms of employment discrimination.290 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a division among
the lower courts regarding whether a provision of Title VII limiting the category of “employers” covered by the statute to entities
having “fifteen or more employees,”291 was “jurisdictional or
simply an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.”292 The Court
ultimately determined that the statute’s employee numerosity requirement was not a jurisdictional limitation based primarily on
its assessment that Congress did not intend the restriction to
carry the types of effects traditionally associated with jurisdictional rules, such as nonwaivability and mandatory judicial selfpolicing.293
This emphasis on effects does as much to obscure as it
does to illuminate. For reasons already discussed, the list of effects typically associated with jurisdictional rules, such as
nonwaivability and insusceptibility to equitable exceptions, are
285 See, e.g., Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 445 (“Clarity would be facilitated if courts and
litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”).
286 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008) (noting
that courts have sometimes used the term “jurisdictional” as a “convenient shorthand” for
time limits that are construed to limit the effects of waiver or that forbid courts from making equitable exceptions); see also, e.g., Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 153 (focusing on the set of
effects that attach to “[c]haracterizing a rule as jurisdictional” and observing that such
effects render jurisdictional rules “unique in our adversarial system”); Henderson, 562
U.S. at 434–36 (describing the significance of jurisdictional characterization in terms of
“the consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label”).
287 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
288 Id. at 515–16.
289 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000h-6).
290 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503–05.
291 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
292 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 509.
293 Id. at 514–16.
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not essential features of jurisdiction.294 Congress is thus free to
attach as many or as few such effects to particular jurisdictional
provisions as it chooses, just as it may attach particular “jurisdictional” consequences to nonjurisdictional rules.295 More basically,
focusing on incidental effects distracts from what should be the
principal focus of interpretive inquiry—namely, whether, in view
of the available interpretive evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
that Congress meant to deprive the federal courts of power to adjudicate the particular claims or category of claims at issue.
In Arbaugh, for example, interpreting the numerosity requirement as a limit on federal adjudicatory authority would have
produced some highly peculiar consequences. For example, because state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII
claims,296 a conclusion that the numerosity requirement functioned as a limit on federal jurisdiction would have left plaintiffs
free to pursue their claims against defendants with fewer than
fifteen employees in state court. Moreover, if the numerosity requirement were regarded as jurisdictional, federal courts considering a Title VII challenge would have no choice but to resolve
that issue before reaching the substantive merits of the case.297
By contrast, interpreting the provision as going only to the substantive merits would allow courts to dispose of Title VII claims
on other merits grounds without reaching the numerosity question—an option that might be particularly attractive where resolving the numerosity issue would require resolution of more
challenging factual or legal issues.298
None of this is to say that effects are wholly irrelevant to the
classification inquiry. Congress does not legislate on a blank
slate, and it thus seems reasonable to presume that when it designates a particular restriction as “jurisdictional,” it intends the
restriction to carry the types of effects typically associated with

294

See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408 n.2 (2015) (“Congress may preclude equitable tolling of even a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations.”); Eberhart v.
United States, 546 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2005) (per curiam) (explaining that a rule can be mandatory without being jurisdictional).
296 Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990).
297 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95 (holding that federal courts must resolve jurisdictional questions before reaching the merits of a claim); see also infra Part V (discussing
jurisdictional sequencing).
298 In Arbaugh, for example, the applicability of the numerosity requirement turned
in part on the determination of whether a certain group of workers was properly regarded
as “employees” within the meaning of Title VII or, instead, consisted of independent contractors. 546 U.S. at 508–09.
295
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that characterization.299 But it is important to recognize the defeasible nature of this presumption and Congress’s correlative
power to alter the precise bundle of effects associated with any
particular “jurisdictional” rule it chooses to prescribe.
Somewhat ironically, given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on
incidental effects as the hallmark of jurisdiction’s identity in recent cases, the Court has been much less attentive to effects that
cut much closer to jurisdiction’s identity as a source of—and limitation on—judicial power.300 In its recent decision in Brownback
v. King,301 the Court demonstrated a basic misunderstanding of
jurisdiction’s relationship to these more central effects by suggesting that a jurisdictionless court possesses the authority to
conclusively bind the parties to its judgment.
Brownback involved claims asserted against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act302 (FTCA), a federal
statute authorizing plaintiffs to sue the United States for injuries
caused by the alleged negligence or wrongful actions of federal
employees in specified circumstances.303 The district court
granted the government’s motion to dismiss those claims, concluding that the allegations did not state a claim for relief.304 The
question before the Supreme Court was whether that dismissal
triggered a provision of the FTCA, providing that “[t]he judgment
in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same
subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act
or omission gave rise to the claim.”305 The Sixth Circuit had found
the judgment bar inapplicable, concluding that the district court’s
dismissal of the case for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” did
not have any preclusive effect.306
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court agreed with the
Sixth Circuit that the district court “did lack subject-matter jurisdiction” over the plaintiff’s improperly pleaded FTCA claims and
acknowledged the usual rule that “a court cannot issue a ruling

299 Cf. In Search of Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 77 (arguing that courts “should consider the effects of characterizing the provision as jurisdictional or procedural” as one
factor, along with others, in determining “whether a jurisdictional or procedural characterization makes sense in the statutory scheme”).
300 See supra Part IV.
301 141 S. Ct. 740 (2021).
302 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–2680 (2018).
303 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
304 Brownback, 141 S. Ct. at 746–47.
305 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
306 Brownback, 141 S. Ct. at 747.
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on the merits ‘when it has no jurisdiction’ because ‘to do so is, by
very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.’” 307 But it nonetheless
concluded that where the requirements of pleading a claim and
the requirements of pleading jurisdiction “entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits that triggers the judgment
bar.”308
The Supreme Court claimed that its decision was consistent
with the common law of claim preclusion as it existed at the time
of the FTCA’s enactment in 1946, citing the First Restatement of
Judgments as support for its interpretation of the FTCA.309 But
the only provision of the First Restatement cited by the Court,
Section 49, provides no support for extending claim-preclusive effect to dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. To the contrary,
Section 49 addresses the effect of a “final personal judgment not
on the merits” in favor of the defendant and makes clear that such
a judgment should not preclude the plaintiff “from thereafter
maintaining an action on the original cause of action.”310 Rather,
such a “judgment is conclusive only as to what [was] actually decided” in the prior proceeding.311 The comments to Section 49
make clear that a judgment “based on the lack of jurisdiction of
the court over the defendant or over the subject of the action” is
not a judgment on the merits and that such judgments do not
“extinguish[ ]” the plaintiff’s cause of action.312 Rather, such a
judgment merely prevents the relitigation of any “matter actually
litigated and determined” in the prior proceeding.313
In other words, according to the First Restatement, judgments rendered by courts that lack jurisdiction over the parties
or the subject matter carry issue-preclusive effect but not claimpreclusive effect.314 The Brownback Court elided this important
distinction between issue preclusion and claim preclusion and
thus misperceived the very different respective relationship that
each doctrine bears to jurisdiction.

307

Id. at 749 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02).
Id.
309 Id. at 748–49; see also James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, The Judgment Bar, and
the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 417, 430 (2011) (noting that the
First Restatement “appeared just four years before the FTCA’s adoption”).
310 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942) (emphasis added).
311 Id.
312 Id. § 49 cmt. a.
313 Id. cmt. b.
314 See supra notes 254–269 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between issue preclusion and claim preclusion).
308
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The Court also invoked the doctrine of “jurisdiction-todetermine-jurisdiction” to support its conclusion that a “federal
court can decide an element of an FTCA claim on the merits if
that element is also jurisdictional.”315 But as discussed above, the
doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction operates to insulate a court’s determination that it possesses jurisdiction from
later attack.316 It does not, as the Brownback Court seems to have
assumed, demand that claim-preclusive effect be given to a court’s
determination that it lacks jurisdiction.
The Brownback decision marks an incautious extension of
preclusion doctrine and an unfortunate aberration in the law of
federal jurisdiction. To the extent possible, it should be narrowly
cabined to the “unique context” of the FTCA, as the Court suggested it might be.317 A better path to the same result—and one
for which the United States advocated in its merits brief to the
Supreme Court—would have been to interpret the FTCA to authorize jurisdiction over cases asserting claims under the statute
even if the district court concludes that the plaintiff fails to state
a claim on the merits.318 Finding the FTCA’s substantive elements
nonjurisdictional would have allowed the courts to accord claimpreclusive effect to dismissals on the merits without distorting
the boundaries of traditional preclusion doctrine or ignoring the
linkage between jurisdiction and judicial power.
But what if this option were unavailable? What if Congress
were to expressly declare that a party’s failure to comply with a
particular statutory restriction to which it had affixed the “jurisdictional” label should result in the entry of a binding, claimpreclusive judgment? Could courts ignore such a statutory directive based solely on their own preferred understanding of “jurisdiction” as an abstract concept? Of course not. Congress is the
master of the language it uses and the courts are obliged to give
effect to statutory language even when Congress chooses words
that, when read in context, depart from standard definitions.319

315

Brownback, 141 S. Ct. at 750.
See supra Parts II.A & II.B. (discussing the origins and the theoretical grounding
of the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine).
317 Brownback, 141 S. Ct. at 749.
318 See Brief for the United States at 32, Brownback, 141 S. Ct. 740 (No. 19-546)
(“[C]ontrary to the reasoning of the panel majority, the district court here did have subjectmatter jurisdiction to enter a preclusive judgment on respondent’s FTCA claims.” (emphasis in original)).
319 See, e.g., Preis, supra note 24, at 1417 (“Congress has the power to create the lower
federal courts, and if it wants to define their jurisdiction in odd ways, it is free to do so—
just as all of us are free to call a tail a leg if it serves our purposes.”).
316
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Congress may, for example, decide to use the term “fruit” in a
manner that excludes tomatoes or the phrase “tangible object” in
a way that excludes undersized fish even if lexicographers (not to
mention botanists and beloved children’s authors) hold different
views regarding those terms’ proper usage.320 But just as an aberrational statutory usage of “tangible object” would not change the
generally accepted meaning of that phrase’s constituent terms, a
usage of “jurisdiction” to mean something other than a court’s adjudicatory power should not be understood to affect the generally
accepted and longstanding meaning of that term.
B. Sequencing
A second doctrinal area that might benefit from a closer focus
on the connection between jurisdiction and power involves the sequencing of issues for decision by the judiciary. For reasons already discussed, the traditional conception of jurisdiction as
power renders the existence of jurisdiction a threshold inquiry
that must be resolved before the court may adjudicate the merits
of a case.321 This conception of jurisdiction’s “threshold” status
was repeatedly invoked by the Supreme Court for more than a
century.322 By the late 1990s, however, nearly all lower federal
appeals courts had embraced some form of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” a doctrine that “allowed courts to adjudicate a dispute and
render a judgment on the merits without first verifying that
subject-matter jurisdiction . . . actually existed.”323
In its 1998 decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,324 the Supreme Court seemed to close the door on
this practice, instructing that “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction
320 See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1893) (determining that a tomato should
be classified as a “vegetable” rather than a “fruit” as those terms were used in the Tariff
Act of 1883, notwithstanding dictionary and botanical definitions suggesting that a tomatoes could properly be considered a “fruit”); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 534–48
(2015) (interpreting a federal statute that criminalized the destruction or concealment of
any “tangible object” in certain circumstances as not applying to a fisherman’s destruction
of undersized grouper); cf. Yates 574 U.S. at 553–54 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Dr.
Seuss’s One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish as support for the proposition that “[a] fish
is . . . a discrete thing that possesses physical form”).
321 See supra notes 274–276 and accompanying text.
322 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 305–06 (1962) (“[A] review of the sources of the Court’s jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry appropriate to the
disposition of every case that comes before us.”); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
159, 172 (1805) (“A doubt has been suggested respecting the jurisdiction of this court . . .
and this question is to be decided before the court can inquire into the merits of the case.”).
323 Scott Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
324 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature
and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” 325 But just two years later, the
Court handed down a decision that seemed to qualify the sweeping holding of Steel Co. In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,326 the
Court held that Steel Co.’s directive “that subject-matter jurisdiction necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits” did “not dictate
a sequencing of jurisdictional issues” and that therefore lower
courts were free to dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction
without first resolving all questions regarding the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction.327
Taken together, Steel Co. and Ruhrgas seemed to demand
that jurisdictional issues be addressed and resolved before any
nonjurisdictional issue while allowing courts a limited degree of
discretion regarding the order in which different kinds of jurisdictional questions should be resolved. This seemingly straightforward demarcation proved untenable, however, following the
Court’s 2007 decision in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
International Shipping Corp.328 Sinochem held that courts need
not confirm the existence of their own jurisdiction before dismissing a case based on the unambiguously nonjurisdictional doctrine
of forum non conveniens.329
Lower courts have struggled to make sense of the Steel Co.–
Ruhrgas-Sinochem line of cases, producing divisions regarding
the proper application of the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional sequencing doctrine. Some lower courts have sought to confine the
Court’s sequencing jurisprudence by reading the command to prioritize subject matter jurisdiction as addressed only to constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction, allowing courts a freer hand
to resequence questions regarding statutory limits on jurisdiction.330 Other courts have disagreed with this approach, insisting

325 Id. at 94–95 (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
326 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
327 Id. at 584–85.
328 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
329 Id. at 432–36.
330 See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 1999)
(interpreting Steel Co. as “‘distinguish[ing] between Article III jurisdiction questions and
statutory jurisdiction questions, holding that the former should ordinarily be decided before the merits, but the latter need not be.”); Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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that it is no more permissible for a court to assume its statutory
jurisdiction than its constitutional jurisdiction.331
Other disagreements center on the range of concededly nonjurisdictional issues that may be addressed and resolved without
resolving all jurisdictional questions.332 Lower courts have held
that a diverse array of such putatively “threshold” issues may be
resolved without a finding of jurisdiction, including preclusion,333
statutes of limitations,334 the availability of a Bivens remedy,335
and the enrolled-bill doctrine.336 But other courts have reached
contrary conclusions with regard to several of these issues.337
Understanding the connection between jurisdiction and
power helps to clarify some of the confusion that has grown up in
the lower courts around the Court’s resequencing line of cases. As
an initial matter, understanding the connection between jurisdiction and judicial power demonstrates the fallacy of the posited
distinction between Article III jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction that many lower courts have embraced. Congress’s power to
establish courts “inferior” to the Supreme Court has long been
understood (correctly) to carry with it the power to define and

331 See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699 F.3d 1280, 1288–89 (11th Cir.
2012); Seale v. INS, 323 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2003).
332 See Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1113
(2013) (“The division among lower courts has been even more pronounced with respect to
clearly nonjurisdictional issues.”).
333 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2016)
(concluding that claim preclusion is a “non-merits” issue that may be addressed before
addressing subject matter jurisdiction); Noone v. Town of Palmer, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8
(D. Mass. 2014) (issue preclusion principles reflect “non-merits, nonjurisdictional” rules of
dismissal which may precede resolution of subject matter jurisdiction questions).
334 See, e.g., Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 503 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273
(D.D.C. 2007) (holding that there was no need to resolve “arduous” jurisdictional questions
where “all the claims are clearly barred by the relevant statutes of limitations”).
335 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571–82 (2009) (declining to resolve the “vexed
question” of whether a statutory bar limited the court’s subject matter jurisdiction where
“the case must be dismissed at the threshold for other reasons”—namely, the unavailability of a Bivens remedy).
336 See, e.g., OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec’y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir.
2007); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1343, 1347–49 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
337 See, e.g., Int’l Precision Components Corp. v. Greenpath Recovery W., Inc., 2018
WL 1920118, at *3 (N.D. Ill. April 24, 2018) (noting that personal jurisdiction “‘must be
addressed and resolved ahead of substantive issues’ such as claim preclusion” (quoting
Weisskopf v. Marcus, 695 F. App’x 977, 978 (7th Cir. 2017)); Bernier v. Trump, 299 F.
Supp. 3d 150, 155–58 (D.D.C. 2018) (deciding that a plaintiff’s claim was moot before considering a Bivens claim and characterizing the decision to address qualified immunity before jurisdiction as “a mistake”).
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limit those courts’ jurisdiction.338 A statutory limit on a lower
court’s jurisdiction is no less a restriction on that court’s adjudicatory authority than is a restriction flowing directly from
Article III itself.339 Courts have no more authority to claim authority withheld from them by statute than they do to exceed the
limits prescribed by the Constitution itself.
Understanding the connection between jurisdiction and
power can also help to clarify the second major set of questions
that have divided lower courts—namely, which types of nonjurisdictional issues are sufficiently distinct from the “merits” that a
court may resolve them before addressing jurisdiction. As discussed above, the most plausible connection between jurisdiction
and power views jurisdiction as a necessary precondition to a
court’s ability to enter a final judgment determining the parties’
respective rights and responsibilities.340 Jurisdiction is thus a necessary prerequisite to a court’s ability to enter a binding judgment
that will either extinguish the parties’ preexisting rights and entitlements or merge them into the judgment itself—i.e., a judgment carrying claim-preclusive effect. 341
As Professor Kevin Clermont has argued, “the list of resequenceable grounds should” thus “include only those defenses
that could result in decisions not on the merits, in the claimpreclusive sense.”342 This approach is consistent with the list of
“non-merits” grounds that the Supreme Court has already held to
be “resequenceable,” such as forum non conveniens343 abstention,344 and discretionary dismissal of state law claims that may
or may not fall within the federal courts’ pendent jurisdiction.345
It is also consistent with the Court’s description in Sinochem of

338 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from
any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies [in
Article III].”).
339 See, e.g., Trammell, supra note 332, at 1128 (“If Congress has imposed a truly jurisdictional requirement, courts have a duty to police that restriction just as rigorously as
a constitutional limitation.”).
340 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text.
342 See Clermont, supra note 19, at 329 (emphasis omitted).
343 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425.
344 See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1975) (finding that a court need not resolve questions of Article III jurisdiction before dismissing a case under the doctrine of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); see also Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (identifying
Ellis as an exception to the categorical rule of Steel Co.).
345 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715–16 (1973); see also Ruhrgas, 526
U.S. at 585 (identifying Moor as a permissible exception to Steel Co.).
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the “principle underlying these decisions”—namely, that jurisdiction “is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the
merits.”346
Lower courts that have embraced an expansive view of their
authority to resequence decisional issues have generally taken a
narrower view of what an “on-the-merits” judgment refers to.
Although not usually explicit about their understanding, courts
embracing this narrower conception seem to equate an “on-themerits” judgment with something like a ruling that requires a
case-specific inquiry into whether plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged (or can prove) facts that would entitle them to relief under
the applicable standards of substantive law. Grounds of decision
that avoid such case-specific substantive analysis—such as statutes of limitations or preclusive prior judgments—are assumed to
be “non-merits” grounds and thus resolvable without an express
finding of jurisdiction.347 But this narrow conception does not
match the much broader sense in which “on the merits” is routinely used in discussions of preclusion law. In the preclusion context, “on the merits” is merely a shorthand way of identifying
judgments entitled to claim-preclusive effect, including judgments that do “not rest on any examination whatever of the substantive rights asserted.”348
This preclusive sense of “on the merits” provides the best understanding of the Supreme Court’s usage of that phrase in
Sinochem and other sequencing cases. This understanding is not
only consistent with the resequenceable grounds that the Court
has already recognized but also the most consistent with the traditional understanding of jurisdiction as the adjudicatory power
of a court. For reasons already discussed, the existence of jurisdiction is a necessary precondition to a court’s ability to bind the

346 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041
(7th Cir. 2006)).
347 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2016) (asserting that a judgment issued “on claim preclusion grounds [ ] is not technically a judgment on the merits” but rather reflects a determination that the merits have already been
resolved elsewhere); Chalabi, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (characterizing a statute-oflimitations defense as a “non-merits ground”); cf. Trammell, supra note 332, at 1136–49
(urging a similar distinction between “conduct rules” and “allocative rules” as a guide for
identifying resequenceable issues).
348 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4435 (rev. ed. 2002); see also Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 74
F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ertain dismissals that do not reach the substantive issues of the litigation still may be regarded as ‘on the merits’ for purposes of res judicata
and preclusion.”).
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parties to the effects of a claim-preclusive judgment.349 A court
that proceeds to a merits determination without verifying its jurisdiction thus risks exercising an authority it does not possess.
The principal objection to this preclusion-centered framework stems from language in Ruhrgas acknowledging that even
jurisdictional dismissals can “preclude the parties from relitigating the very same . . . issue” in later litigation.350 But this objection ignores the important distinction between issue preclusion
and claim preclusion and those two doctrines’ very different respective relationships to jurisdiction. As discussed above, preclusion doctrine has long recognized that dismissals on jurisdictional
grounds can preclude relitigation of the specific issues actually
litigated and necessarily decided by the court.351 No similar
longstanding history supports according claim-preclusive effect to
jurisdictionless judgments. The prospect that dismissals on “nonmerits” grounds other than jurisdiction may similarly carry certain issue-preclusive effects is thus far less problematic for the
conceptual ideal of jurisdiction than the prospect of allowing
courts to bind the parties to claim-preclusive judgments without
even deciding whether they possess the authority to do so.
C. The Separation of Powers and Jurisdictional
Departmentalism
A final set of debates that might be illuminated by a clearer
understanding of the connection between jurisdiction and power
involves the question of what effect must be given to judicial decisions by officials in other branches of the federal government.
These debates are often framed in terms of a posited distinction
between “judicial supremacy”—roughly, the idea that “the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution should be
taken by all other officials, judicial and nonjudicial, as having an
authoritative status equivalent to the Constitution itself”352—and
“judicial departmentalism”—roughly, the idea that “each branch,
or department, of government has an equal authority to interpret
the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties.”353 These
349

See supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text.
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585; see also Trammell, supra note 332, at 1130–32 (contending that Ruhrgas and other cases acknowledging that jurisdictional dismissals can carry
issue-preclusive effect render preclusion-centered theories descriptively implausible).
351 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
352 Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455 (2000).
353 Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 782–83 (2002).
350
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debates center mostly on the question of what effect should be
given to judicial precedents by nonjudicial actors.
A less visible corner of this debate centers on the obligation
of nonjudicial officials—principally the president and other members of the executive branch—to comply with courts’ final judgments.354 By far the dominant view among judicial supremacists
and departmentalists alike has been that executive branch officials are bound to obey federal court judgments.355 But a handful
of departmentalists have argued that the same considerations authorizing the president to exercise independent judgment regarding the meaning of the Constitution support a limited or absolute
presidential privilege to disregard judgments because they are
wrong.356
In a recent Article, Professor William Baude suggested a middle position in this debate—one that accepts the consensus view
of the binding force of judgments on the executive branch but contends that this duty is limited to those instances in which courts
act within the lawful scope of their jurisdiction.357 Drawing on the
traditional connection between jurisdiction and power, Baude argues that courts are empowered to bind other branches of government only when they act within the legitimate scope of their jurisdiction; purported judgments that exceed that jurisdiction may
thus be regarded by the president and other members of the executive branch as void and of no legal effect.358
But as Baude himself recognizes, this connection between jurisdiction and judicial power raises an important corollary question—namely, “who decides whether a court has jurisdiction?”359

354

See Baude, supra note 53, at 1832–34 (summarizing this aspect of the debate).
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993) (“[T]here is widespread agreement
that the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by courts,
regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for
the judgment.”).
356 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1325 (1996) (“[T]he President may legally refuse to enforce a court judgment, but only if the President concludes, in accordance with
an appropriately demanding standard of proof, that the judgment was constitutionally
erroneous.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 83–84 (1993) (contending
that accepting autonomous presidential authority to interpret the Constitution necessarily implies a corollary authority to disobey “a judicial decree that [the President believes to be] predicated on an incorrect understanding of the Constitution”).
357 See generally Baude, supra note 53.
358 Id. at 1846 (“[J]udgments bind the President when they have jurisdiction, and
when they don’t, they don’t.”).
359 Id.
355
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Given the judiciary’s embrace of the bootstrap principle, requiring
the executive branch to acknowledge the validity of any judgment
that the federal courts would regard as valid risks “collapsing
‘judgments within a court’s jurisdiction’ into ‘judgments, period.’” 360 Such an approach would thus leave little meaningful role
for independent judgment by members of the executive branch
regarding which judgments are or are not obligatory.
The analysis presented here supports the view that the executive branch may exercise its own independent judgment in
determining whether a particular judgment falls within the jurisdiction of the rendering court.361 This conclusion draws support
from both the history of jurisdiction in the Anglo-American legal
tradition and from the perspectival nature of jurisdiction (and of
existence conditions more generally). As discussed above, the
voidness of jurisdictionless judgments reflected the traditional
common law view for centuries leading up to the Constitution’s
enactment and for more than a century thereafter.362 Given the
comparatively late arrival of the bootstrap principle in U.S. law,
it seems highly doubtful that the recognitional criteria it prescribes should be seen as effectively “baked in” to the meaning of
Article III.363
And because it is not uncommon for different institutional actors to adopt different criteria for determining the validity of a
claimed source of law,364 allowing executive branch officials to exercise independent judgment regarding the scope of judicial jurisdiction may be less threatening to the separation of powers than

360

Id.
Baude notes that the president may not necessarily possess the final word on the
jurisdictional validity of a particular judgment because the question of that judgment’s
validity may come before the courts in a later proceeding. Id. at 1848–49. Even if the president disagrees with the court’s reasoning in that later case—for example, because the
later court applied the bootstrap doctrine to validate the earlier court’s judgment—such
an objection would not provide a ground for disregarding that second court’s judgment,
provided that second court actually did possess jurisdiction. Id. at 1848. But as Baude
acknowledges, this successive-litigation strategy could only succeed if the president concedes that the second court actually possesses jurisdiction. Id. at 1849.
362 See supra Part II.
363 See Baude, supra note 53, at 1847 (“Even if Article III incorporated or reflected
background principles of civil procedure at the time of its enactment, it is not clear that
modern changes in procedural doctrines should also change the constitutional rule.”).
364 Cf. supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text; see also Adler & Dorf, supra
note 104, at 1181–93 (identifying the political question doctrine and the rational basis
standard of constitutional review as additional examples of possible judicial “underenforcement” of existence conditions).
361
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it might, at first, appear.365 The federal courts have long claimed
authority to exercise independent judgment when reviewing the
conduct of both Congress and the president without feeling themselves bound by those branches’ understandings of their own
constitutional powers.366 Presidents have asserted a similar authority when reviewing acts of Congress.367 Of course, unlike the
president or Congress, the judiciary may possess a qualified
“right to be wrong” about constitutional meaning and even to compel other institutional actors to act on such incorrect understandings.368 But such a “right to be wrong” exists only by virtue of those
courts’ constitutionally and statutorily conferred jurisdiction. Far
from an infringement of the separation of powers, allowing the
president some independent ability to police the outer boundaries
of the courts’ jurisdiction might well be an indispensable ingredient of the separation-of-powers framework.369
An important question remains, however, regarding which
recognitional criteria the executive branch should adopt in determining whether a particular court acted within the scope of its
jurisdiction. Even if the president is not bound as a matter of constitutional obligation to accept the courts’ assertions of their own
jurisdiction at face value, there may be sound pragmatic reasons
for giving jurisdictional determinations by the judiciary at least
some degree of deference. For one thing, the same considerations

365 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Political Questions and the Ultra Vires Conundrum, 87
U. CHI. L. REV. 1481, 1544 (2020) (“To many contemporary Americans, the departmentalist approach looks clumsy, chaotic, and frightening.”).
366 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding that
Congress lacked the authority to expand the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction beyond limits
prescribed by Article III); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89
(1952) (holding that President Harry S. Truman lacked the authority to unilaterally seize
control of steel mills without statutory authorization).
367 See, e.g., ANDREW JACKSON, VETO MESSAGE (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576–91 (Washington,
D.C., Gov’t Printing Off., James Richardson ed., 1897) (defending the veto of the statute
rechartering the Bank of the United States on constitutional grounds despite an earlier
Supreme Court decision concluding that legislation was within Congress’s constitutional
authority).
368 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
369 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 365, at 1544 (“[A]ccording any official or institution a
boundless authority to determine its own jurisdiction leaves no logical space between a
claim of lawful authority and an assertion of potentially arbitrary power.”); Lawson &
Moore, supra note 356, at 1324 (“If judgments are truly and absolutely binding, then the
federal courts, through the issuance of judgments, can take command of all aspects of the
government.”). But cf. Baude, supra note 53, at 1848–49 (noting that the jurisdictional
validity of a particular judgment may sometimes be placed at issue in a later case before
a court that all sides agree possesses jurisdiction to conclusively resolve the question of
the original court’s jurisdiction).
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of certainty, finality, and efficiency that drove U.S. courts to embrace the bootstrap doctrine may also support according some
degree of deference to judicial resolutions of jurisdictional questions.370 In the specific context of interbranch disputes, additional
concerns exist regarding the potential impairment of rule-of-law
values resulting from multiple “official” pronouncements where
no institution possesses the acknowledged authority to act as the
final arbiter of legal correctness.371
The precise degree of deference that the executive branch
should give to courts’ jurisdictional determinations is a subject on
which reasonable minds can differ. Pressed to its limits, a highly
deferential approach might even resemble something like the
bootstrap doctrine itself, which, under its most prominent formulations, embraces a very limited exception for actions that are so
“plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction” as to constitute “a manifest abuse of authority.”372 It is important to recognize, however,
that any such deference should be viewed a matter of policy and
pragmatism. As a strictly formal matter, a court without jurisdiction lacks the power to bind anyone to its view of the law, the
president most certainly included. If a president is sufficiently
certain that a purported judgment has issued from a court that
lacked the requisite jurisdiction, she is free under the
Constitution to disregard that court and treat its ruling as of no
more force or effect than “mere waste paper.”373
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction is both a conceptual ideal and a messy reality.
The bootstrap doctrine’s ascendance in the middle decades of the
twentieth century reflected a choice to sacrifice some degree of the
coherence associated with the conceptual ideal of jurisdiction as

370 See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale underlying
decisions that embraced the bootstrap principle).
371 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 365, at 1541 (describing—without endorsing—the
view that “it would better promote the rule of law and other relevant values for conscientious officials and citizens to accept judicial rulings on the outer boundaries of judicial
jurisdiction as authoritative, even if fair-minded observers would adjudge the judicial rulings ultra vires”).
372 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12; cf. Fallon, supra note 365, at 1544
(“In my view, the most reasonable accommodation of competing rule-of-law ideals—even
in cases involving plausible allegations of ultra vires action by the judicial branch—calls
for a very strong but not absolutely irrebuttable presumption that final judicial rulings
authoritatively settle the obligations of the parties.”).
373 See Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 475 (1836) (describing a jurisdictionless judgment as “waste paper”).
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power in order to accommodate the felt necessities of litigation
reality. But the ideal itself still retains value.
The goal of this Article has been to demonstrate that the
power-based conception remains a descriptively plausible and
normatively desirable description of jurisdiction’s conceptual
identity, notwithstanding the bootstrap doctrine’s predominance.
The power-based conception not only conforms to centuries of pretwentieth-century legal thought and at least one prominent
strand of contemporary thinking about jurisdiction’s identity but
also facilitates jurisdiction’s distinctive role in dispersing and allocating power among different decision-making institutions. A
clearer understanding of what it means to speak of jurisdiction as
power should help to clarify thinking about jurisdiction’s necessary and incidental effects and minimize confusion surrounding
both jurisdictional doctrine and the judiciary’s relationship to
other constitutional actors.

